Brief Lecture Notes for Unit 9

Part One:  What is a stage theory?

People often use the language of developmental stages in a loose, nontechnical way:  "Oh, that's just a stage she's going through."  But developmental psychologists use this language in a much more precise fashion.  True stage theories make the following assumptions about human development:

1.  Development is discontinuous.  That is, rather than expecting that change occurs at a constant, linear rate, stage theorists expect periods of rapid transformation to be interspersed with "slack" times of seemingly little change (more precisely, integration and consolidation of previous changes).  In other words, the stages are "real":  they can be objectively identified or spotted in the data (if we graph chronological age against some measure of development or maturity).  They are not just a polite verbal fiction or shorthand:  they exist in a more objective sense.  (Modern stage theorists have backed off somewhat on their claims about the "pure" objectivity of the stages, but would still basically agree with the narrative above.)

2.  The stages differ qualitatively.  As noted in Unit 8, "qualitative" change means a difference in type or kind (rather than just a difference in amount, or "quantitative" change).  In other words, there is a radical shift or "quantum leap" in the nature of psychological processes as one moves from one stage to another:  children are not just miniature adults.

3.  There is an invariant developmental sequence.  Regardless of culture, a "pure" stage theorist would say, everyone goes through the same stages in the same order or sequence (though not necessarily at the same rate).

Part Two:  Piaget's stage theory of cognitive development

Piaget's theory of cognitive development is based on three key concepts:  schemata, assimilation, and accommodation.  Understanding these ideas is the key that unlocks his entire theory.

A schema (plural:  schemata) is a mental model, a way of understanding the world, a set of assumptions or understandings about reality.  (Note the connection to the idea of paradigms as outlined by Thomas Kuhn and as discussed in Unit 1.)  For instance, religious and philosophical worldviews are schemata:  a theist, a monist, and an atheist differ in their schematic understandings of ultimate reality.  Political views are schemata;  attitudes and values are schemata;  to some extent at least, interests and motivations are (partly) schemata.

For all of us, schemata are a two-edged sword.  Without them, we cannot think at all:  reality is too complex to be understood and interpreted unless it is filtered mentally through a set of assumptions and values and ideas.  But schemata are also limiting and potentially distorting, because (even if we try very hard not to do so) to some extent we can't help but notice confirming evidence (data and experience that fit our schemata), while tending to ignore, downplay, disparage, or explain away disconfirming or contradictory evidence.  This is universal:  and in fact no schema is watertight, all are subject to anomalies that the schema cannot explain.  We hold to our schemata even though they are less than perfect because (among other things) it is humanly impossible to think or act except in the context of a schema.  "The purpose of an open mind is to close it on something" (G. K. Chesterton);  yet in doing so we do not want to become so closed-minded that we allow our schemata to distort reality or to become impervious to new evidence.  This is the tightrope walk we all must make;  this is the human condition.

When experience is fitted into an existing schema (this comprises the bulk of our normal mental operations), this is assimilation.  But sometimes the disparity between an existing schema and outward reality (data) becomes excessive;  the anomalies proliferate.  When this happens, the cognitive dissonance or emotional tension induced by the discrepancy can motivate a person to alter the schema or to search for a new, alternative schema -- sometimes abandoning the old one, sometimes incorporating it into a  broader one.  This process of mental change and transformation is accommodation.  This model explains, among other things, (a) why most of us are so resistant to changing our mind -- which is not always a bad thing, for it adds consistency and stability to our personality, choices, priorities, and outlook;  (b) why, on those occasions when we do change our mind, change often seems to occur dramatically, even catastrophically, in a "quantum leap" transformation of perspective;  (c) why such changes, once they occur, are often (though not always) irreversible;  (d) why, in talking with someone who holds a point of view we used to have (what for us is an outmoded schema), it is so difficult to take the other's mental perspective in a fair-minded manner.  Think about times in your life when you have changed your mind and see whether or not Piaget's assumptions match the reality of your own experience.  Of course, some of us are more drawn to change than others (see Unit 10 for a discussion of personality differences that might be related to that:  see the dimension of Openness on the Big Five model of personality);  as Chesterton wrote, the job of liberals is to keep making blindingly new mistakes, while the job of conservatives is to ensure that old mistakes never get corrected.  This means plenty of work for everybody.

The four stages of cognitive development in Piagetian theory are the sensorimotor (approximately 0-2 years of age, or generally isomorphic with infancy), the preoperational (approximately 2-7 years of age or roughly coinciding with the preschool years), the concrete operations (approximately 7-14 years of age or essentially covering the grade school and middle school years), and the formal operations (14+ years, that is, adolescence and adulthood) stages.  Don't take these age ranges too literally;  particularly with regard to the last stage, many 18-year-olds have not yet fully made the leap to formal operational thought.  Piaget did not make any further subdivisions within, or extensions beyond, this last stage, but some of his followers have as noted below.  Under conditions of stress or cognitive overload, people tend to revert or regress temporarily to forms of thinking that are characteristic of earlier stages, or that are more primitive.  Each stage is characterized by schemata of a particular type.

The sensorimotor stage

The sensorimotor stage is characterized by pre-linguistic or externalized schemata for which there is no meaningful distinction between inward thought and outward action... to think is to do, to do is to think.  (In contrast, adults can -- and sometimes even do! -- think without acting.)  It can be subdivided into six substages:

• The reflex activities substage (0-1 mo.) in which no coherent voluntary or operant (see Unit 6) behaviors occur.  (In reality, Piaget was too pessimistic about the existence of operant behaviors in the neonate, but they are subtle and not too worthy of comment or attention.)
• The primary circular reactions substage (1-4 mo.)  In general, any kind of circular reaction involves the repetition of behaviors that are initially discovered through trial and error;  primary circular reactions are the simplest kind, as they do not involve any demonstrable awareness of the self-world distinction and involve the child's body only, not the use or manipulation of objects or tools.  Since, while simple, these are spontaneous or operant behaviors, we can say for certain at this substage that the capacity for voluntary behavior has been achieved.
• The secondary circular reactions substage (4-8 mo.), in which the circular reactions do begin to utilize objects, thus showing both an awareness of the self-world distinction and also the beginnings of object permanence, the recognition that the external world (and elements within it) has an independent existence of its own... objects (and people) continue to exist even when out of the infant's sight.
• The coordination of secondary circular reactions substage (8-12 mo.) in which, for the first time, individual behaviors are put together into chains or sequences (some behaviors are now, not ends in themselves, but means to an end).  This is the rudimentary beginning of goal-oriented behavior and of the capacity to delay gratification.
• The tertiary circular reactions substage (12-18 mo.)  Unlike the other two, simpler kinds of circular reactions, tertiary reactions no longer involve blind, exact repetition, but rather, variations or changes on a theme... boldly going where no toddler has gone before... indicating the beginnings of behavioral novelty and flexibility.
• The internalization of thought substage (18-24 mo.) in which, gradually and for the first time, children begin to separate thought from action, thus internalizing their schematic processes and thus launching a movement out of the sensorimotor stage altogether.  From this point on, schemata are usually internal and mental, though they can and often do lead to outward actions.

The preoperational stage

In this stage, the complete internalization of thought (though vestiges of externalization remain, e.g., "lip reading" or "talking to oneself") means the capacity for symbolic representation.  A symbol (one thing that stands for something else) could be a word, a picture, or a form of "pretend play".  This is a great advancement over the sensorimotor stage.  But the preoperational stage is still limiting as compared to adult thought:  it shows strong evidence of many characteristic liabilities (schematic weaknesses or anomalies) including the following:

• Egocentrism, which does not (in Piagetian thought) mean selfishness, but rather the inability (as opposed to the unwillingness) to take another's perspective or even to recognize that others have different perspectives and points of view.  (While vestiges of egocentrism remain in adults, we at least can recognize the problem and take steps to correct or minimize it.)  
• Centering, or the inability to view a situation from two different aspects at the same time.  So-called conservation problems (discussed in lecture... too lengthy to type out the details here) are a good illustration of the existence of centering.
• Animism, or the tendency to attribute psychological properties to inanimate objects.  Some cultural issues intrude here (some cultures are more likely to promote animistic, versus mechanistic, views of reality, and these cultural messages may well shape the child's way of thinking), but even so, preoperational children are much more likely to think animistically than are adults... though for me personally, when my computer locks up, my first thought is that it hates me.  (As we'll learn in Unit 10 as we explore the Big Five model of personality, some people are more prone to think in animistic terms, others in mechanistic terms.  Here's a statement that will make sense once you get to Unit 10:  overall, O+ A+ people are more likely to think animistically, O- A- people mechanistically.)
• The lack of operational thought.  By an "operation" we mean the mental reversal of an observed action.  Only gradually do children learn which kinds of events in life are reversible (if you drop a toy, you can pick it up again in reality as well as in fantasy) and which are not (if you break an egg, you cannot "unbreak" it except in fantasy).  The lack of this kind of mental ability, which as adults we largely take for granted, underlies the preoperational child's inability to solve many kinds of problems that seem "obvious" or "self evident" from an adult perspective... if you want some specific examples, attend the lecture.

The concrete operations stage

The concrete operations child largely transcends the above intellectual limitations, and hence is far more adultlike in her/his thinking.  But s/he retains one clear liability, namely, the inability to think in abstract terms:  her/his thought is generally bounded by immediate, concrete experience.  As a result, concrete operations children usually experience difficulties like the following:

• Inability to deal with hypothetical or contrary-to-fact information:  a question that the child can answer easily if posed in terms of her/his own life experience may suddenly seem uninterpretable if asked in a different way that is logically equivalent but factually wrong.  Asked "if a 3-headed fish flew 2 miles on Monday and 3 miles on Tuesday, how far did it fly altogether?" the child may resist, saying that since fish don't have three heads and can't fly, there is no answer... not seeing that the abstract principle (what is 2 + 3?) is the same regardless of the contrafactual elements in the story problem.
• Inability to utilize conservative focusing, which means the ability to solve problems systematically by changing one element of the problem at a time.  A good way to test this ability is the parlor game of "Twenty Questions":  prior to a certain age, children will just start guessing names at random, or will ask a few general questions but fail to narrow down their guesses based on the answers to those questions.
• Inability to utilize algorithms:  an algorithm is a general solution strategy (such as an algebraic formula) that can be used to solve an entire class of problems with the same inherent logical structure.  Adults faced with a novel problem may not know what the right algorithm is, but usually recognize that there must be one, or attempt to search for one;  concrete operations children generally do not.

The formal operations stage

When the above limitations are overcome, we have "adultlike" thinking.  While Piaget did not differentiate between the thinking of younger adults (or adolescents) and older adults, some of his followers have.  One common distinction involves the contrast between two kinds of intelligence or mental ability, one of which appears to decrease with age, the other of which increases with age, throughout the adult years:

• Fluid intelligence means mental quickness or flexibility:  the ability to respond rapidly and efficiently, or to assimilate new information quickly and easily.  By age 30, measures of fluid intelligence such as response time are already on the decline.
• Crystallized intelligence means mental sophistication or depth:  the ability to see connections between ideas, to put ideas in context, to weigh things in a sound manner... rather like what folk culture calls "wisdom".  Absent neurological damage, there is every evidence that crystallized intelligence continues to grow without limit throughout life.

Thus, as the balance between fluid and crystallized intelligence gradually shifts throughout the adult years, the general nature of people's thought processes (and schemata) also change.  This is far from irrelevant to educators who work with mixed-age classes!

Part Three:  Erikson's stage theory of socioemotional development

Erikson's model of socioemotional development is a stage theory, and thus accepts the three foundational premises of all stage theories (above).  But, in addition, it makes three additional assumptions:

1.  Each stage is characterized by a particular issue, challenge, or developmental crisis that the individual needs to face and resolve, a concern or preoccupation that typically takes "center stage" in the person's development during that phase of their life.  Don't assume from the word "crisis" that this is always a threatening or negative experience (though sometimes it is);  the original Greek root krisis means, not necessarily a negative experience, but a test, a judgment, a decision point, a culmination, or a defining "watershed" experience.  As we all know, passing a test can be an exhilirating experience, though failing one may not be.  Some of Erikson's followers prefer the seemingly more neutral term developmental task, but this doesn't convey the sense of urgency and psychological centrality that Erikson's original term does.

2.  The optimal (best or most adaptive, productive, functional) resolution of a developmental crisis always involves a creative tension or balance between two opposite or opposing extremes.  In other words, psychological health is a tightrope walk:  it is like driving a car along a very narrow road, with an abyss on either side.  (C.S. Lewis once wrote that the devil always sends us errors in pairs of opposites, hoping that in our zeal to avoid one, we will fall headlong into the other.  This is very much in the spirit of Erikson's idea.)  In general, balanced resolutions are more likely to produce psychological growth and health than are unbalanced, extreme, lopsided resolutions.

3.  The stages are cumulative in that each builds on the last:  how a person handles one stage sets the stage for her/his handling of the next one.  This implies, of course, that early stages are disproportionately significant, and is in line with Erikson's belief that early childhood is psychologically crucial:  along with Freud (see Unit 11) and others, Erikson believed that the fundamental outlines of human personality were formed early in life, though he was more optimistic than Freud about the ability of adults to shape their personality development.

Thus, a complete understanding of the eight stages of Erikson's model will include the following information about each stage:

1.  The name of the stage

2.  The approximate age range associated (in Erikson's original formulation) with that stage;  again, don't take these too literally, as the world has changed appreciably since Erikson's day

3.  The nature of the developmental crisis associated with that stage

4.  The two extreme resolutions that exist -- the two sources of creative tension

5.  The nature of an optimal, balanced resolution between them

6.  (for every stage except the first)  How that stage builds on the foundation of the previous, preceding stage

Let's see... 8 x 6 = (carry the 1)... 48, so to master this model, you'll need to remember 48 - 1 = 47 pieces of information (since point #6 means nothing for the first stage, as there is no "preceding stage").  That's not too bad;  as we learned in Unit 7, it's impossible for LTM to become "full".  So, let's start our tour of the eight stages... followed by a constructive critique of Erikson's theory in light of the New Millennium.

1.  Basic trust (0-1 yr.)

Developmental crisis:  Is the social world a trustworthy place in which I can count on my needs being met?

Extreme resolutions:  (1) Excessive trust, or excessive optimism about other people's motives, probably resulting from parental overindulgence.  (2) Insufficient trust, or excessive pessimism about other people's motives, probably resulting from parental underindulgence.  (PSY 360 students reading this, if any:  note comparisons to material on infant attachment -- Ainsworth's model, Unit 6.)

Balanced resolution:  A generally trusting (but appropriately selective, and not overly gullible) life orientation;  rational optimism, tempered by a reasonable degree of needful skepticism.

Dependence on previous stage:  None, since there is no previous stage in Erikson's model.  (Wow, I coulda had a V-8.)

2.  Autonomy (1-3 yr.)

Developmental crisis:  Am I an independent person who exists apart from others?  Do I have a will of my own?

Extreme resolutions:  (1) Insufficient autonomy (inability to say no, being bound entirely by what others want, compulsive conformity, extreme unassertiveness);  (2) Excessive or compulsive autonomy (lack of concern about others' needs and wishes, compulsive rebelliousness, extreme aggressiveness).

Balanced resolution:  Reasoned self-assertion that includes both the ability to act independently and a balancing, empathic awareness of and concern for others' needs;  the ability to say both "no" and "yes" to what others want.

Dependence on previous stage:  If you can't trust that your parents' love for you is unconditional, you can't risk the rejection you fear would ensure if you said no to them;  or, you will compulsively rebel out of despair at not being loved at all.

3.  Initiative (3-5 yr.)

Developmental crisis:  Can I take appropriate risks, try new things, develop goal-oriented behaviors, explore my world?

Extreme resolutions:  (1) Excessive (foolish, irrational, unwarranted) risk-taking, impulsivity, blindness to consequences;  (2) Insufficient risk-taking, overdeliberateness, shyness, constricted behavior, fear of taking chances.

Balanced resolution:  An ability to evaluate risks in a reasoned manner, to take rational risks but not irrational ones;  to jump into the pool of life, but only after making sure there's water in it.

Dependence on previous stage:  If you can't act autonomously, you can't channel your autonomous action into a specific direction (targeted risks or goals or ventures).  If you don't have a will, you can't direct that will. 

4.  Industry (5-14 yr.)

Developmental crisis:  Am I good at anything, and if so, what?  Do I have a realistic basis for self-esteem?

Extreme resolutions:  (1) Unrealistic sense of superiority (I falsely think I'm the best at everything;  I have to win at everything, I can't take second place);  (2) Unrealistic sense of inferiority (I falsely think I'm the worst at everything;  I think of myself as no good or as valueless, or give up on life).

Balanced resolution:  A realistic sense of self-worth based on an honest assessment of strengths and weaknesses.  I know and like myself and know what I do well, but also can admit what I do poorly without shattering my self-esteem.

Dependence on previous stage:  The only way I can discover my competencies is to try new activities, which means taking risks.

5.  Identity (14-21 yr.)

Developmental crisis:  Who am I?  What is my niche or place in the world?  In what social roles do I want to invest my time and my life?  Where do I fit in?

Extreme resolutions:  (1) Premature role commitment, or deciding on an identity too quickly;  bypassing the exploration phase entirely and jumping immediately to the commitment phase;  being too convergent;  (2) Role diffusion, or delaying identity decisions too long;  staying stuck in the exploration phase and never really moving to the commitment phase;  being too divergent.

Balanced resolution:  Devoting an appropriate amount of time to each of the two phases above;  allowing yourself to divergently explore role possibilities in the course of a psychological moratorium, but then narrowing down, committing, and implementing a decision.

Dependence on previous stage:  Hopefully, good identity decisions are based on accurate self-knowledge about competencies (strengths and weaknesses, as well as likes and dislikes).

6.  Intimacy (21-40 yr.)

Developmental crisis:  Can I develop and commit to a sense of shared identity that transcends my own individual selfhood?  (Traditionally and narrowly defined, Erikson had in mind committed romantic or intimate relationship, but more widely, intimacy issues include group belongingness - friendships and social group membership issues as well.)  In other words, is there a "we" that transcends the "me" of my selfhood?

Extreme resolutions:  (1) Insufficient abandonment of selfhood;  even in my closest relationships, our lives only touch on the surface;  two people living in the same house, but sharing psychologically separate lives;  unwillingness to sacrifice personal fulfillment for the sake of the other.  (2) Excessive abandonment of selfhood;  I become a mere part or extension of the other person or of the relationship, or am "swallowed up" by it;  I retain no sense of independent identity or selfhood at all.

Balanced resolution:  The "we" (health of the relationship) takes primacy over the "me" (individual autonomy and personal fulfillment) to an appreciable extent, but yet allowing room for substantial continued investment in individuality and personal goals.  (Note the intrusion of cultural values here:  some cultures are more individualistic, others more communitarian or collective, and depending on culture, the optimal balance point might be seen as being at a different place on the continuum, though all might agree that at least to some extent, both the "we" and the "me" are important.)  Note also that in traditional gender formulations, men are more likely to err in the direction of extreme resolution (1) above, women in the direction of extreme resolution (2), though that's less true in recent decades.

Dependence on previous stage:  If I don't yet have a self, I can't share it.  I can only give away what I already possess.

7.  Generativity (40-65 yr.)

Developmental crisis:  What is my "psychological legacy"?  Have I found a way to give back to the world, to leave the world a better place than when I entered it, to make a difference with my life, to invest what remains of my life in others (such as the following generation)?  (Erikson probably thought narrowly of child-rearing, but of course, people without children can meet generativity needs in a variety of other ways -- teaching, counseling, public service, volunteer work, philanthropy, social outreach, or just being a concerned citizen and a caring person and a good neighbor.)

Extreme resolutions:  (1) Remaining interocentric or self-focused on my own needs, and not rising to the challenge of becoming concerned about others;  (2) Becoming so exterocentric that I forget that I am still a person who has needs, and that I can only pour from a full cup, not an empty one.

Balanced resolution:  Becoming increasingly exterocentric, transcending purely individualistic or ego-based concerns in favor of the common or wider good (investing my life in something higher or transcendent), but not to the point that I forget about my own needs.  I learn to love my neighbor as myself, but not instead of myself.

Dependence on previous stage:  Intimacy is a training ground for generativity, or the kindergarten of generativity:  if I haven't learned how to give back to (and sacrifice for) someone who (ideally) does the same in return for me, how can I move on to giving to and sacrificing to those who won't or can't return the favor?

8.  Integrity (65+ yr.)

Developmental crisis:  Looking back over my entire life, am I pleased with how I have lived it?

Extreme resolutions:  (1) Premature withdrawal from life, or "giving up on life too early";  (2) Holding on too tightly to life, or failing to accept the realities of aging and mortality.

Balanced resolution:  Continuing to engage life until you die, but in a realistic way that "lets go of the reins" and is willing to pass power and control on to the next generation, shifting increasingly from an activity-based to a reflection-based way of life, or from the cultural center (at least in terms of economic productivity and social status) to its periphery.  (Note that modern American culture, which is perhaps the most obsessively youth-worshipping culture that has ever existed in human history, does not make this easy, as compared to prototypical cultures that view the elderly as a valued repository of wisdom and cultural values and traditions.)

Dependence on previous stage:  One's ability to look back with contentment on one's entire life obviously depends on how one has lived in all the previous stages, but most notably on the extent to which one has achieved ego transcendence and a "psychological legacy" in the generativity stage.

A moderately constructive critique

Most students with whom I've shared this model think that Erikson remains quite cogent and relevant to life in the 21st century, but that some revisions and updates to his model are required.  Some of the most frequent criticisms include the following:

1.  It's no longer true that the developmental crises (particularly those of adulthood) are "once for all" issues that can be resolved permanently.  For instance, identity issues (such as career choices) can't be made on a "once for all" basis any more;  the average twenty-year-old entering the job market for the first time today can expect, on average, 9 to 13 job changes in a working lifetime, including 3 to 5 radical career shifts (from CPA to neurosurgeon to fighter pilot to bungee jumping instructor).  Thus, the later stages may have more of a cyclic than a linear aspect to them.

2.  The adult stages probably do not follow one another in a purely sequential fashion as Erikson imagined, but rather, probably overlap to an appreciable extent.  In part this is because it's no longer possible to resolve some of them so quickly as in Erikson's day.  For example, think of the number of career choices available to you today (some 16,000 according to the federal government, and that doesn't include careers that are too new to have captured the attention of the Bureau of Labor Statistics), compared to the options available in 1902 (when every woman was expected to become a homemaker, and every man was expected to follow in his father's footsteps -- in an era when 95% of working  Americans were self-employed small farmers).

3.  Some students complain about the notion that identity must precede intimacy, claiming that they can find themselves in relationship ("I didn't know who I was until I met the love of my life").  Frankly, I tend to agree with Erikson, but I'm willing to listen to the counterargument;  however, if valid in its entirety, it would suggest that laws prohibiting marriages between 14-year-olds should be repealed.  Absent a coherent sense of self, what passes for love is mostly a transference reaction (see Unit 11), and transference reactions by definition are not reality-based.

4.  Given dramatic increases in the human lifespan (at least in industrialized societies), starting the integrity stage at 65 is probably premature (most adults who are 50 or younger today may never entirely retire from the workplace at all), and more significantly still, a ninth stage is probably needed to differentiate the "young old" from the "old old".  (After all, one might expect that a person who lives to age 95 has changed as much from age 65-95 as s/he did from age 35-65.)

Study Guide

1.  What are three basic assumptions of any stage theory? Define or explain each.

2.  Explain, and give some concrete examples of, schemata, assimilation, accommodation, cognitive dissonance, and cognitive overload.  How do these concepts underlie Piaget's theory of cognitive development?

3.  Summarize Piagetian theory, emphasizing how cognition changes at each stage.  Include a discussion of the following concepts:  circular reactions, object permanence, internalization of schemata, egocentrism, animism, centering, operational thought, conservative focusing, algorithms.

4.  How do fluid and crystallized intelligence differ?  What implications does this concept have for educators (and for students)?

5.  What three additional assumptions (other than those common to all stage theories, above) does Erikson make about psychosocial development?  Explain.  What is meant by a developmental crisis?  An optimal resolution?

6.  Summarize Erikson's theory, discussing the developmental crisis associated with each stage, the balance between opposing extreme resolutions, and the dependence of each stage on the previous stage.

7.  Offer a constructive critique of Erikson's theory in light of the 21st century.

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