Brief Lecture Notes for Unit 10
This unit has to do with children's moral development, with a primary emphasis on Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. Throughout the history of public education in America, the question of what role (if any) the public schools should have in fostering children's moral development has been a hotly debated one, for a variety of reasons. One of the most difficult issues has to do with the handling of moral issues in a diverse, pluralistic, and increasingly multicultural society. Since there is no clear-cut value consensus on many moral issues in society, how do we foster ethical and moral maturity in children without running afoul of the First Amendment, and/or of the right of parents to promote whatever set of moral values they choose vis-a-vis their own children? My guess is that in the next 10-15 years, our society is going to have to come to terms with that question (the present solution has not worked well in the minds of many). The generational model of history suggests possible cyclic changes in approaches to such matters: adult consensus about moral issues is presumably highest in Civic eras, lowest in Idealist eras; child compliance with adult standards is presumably highest in Adaptive eras, lowest in Reactive eras. (Concerns about "social breakdown" or rampant anomie in society tend to recur mostly during Reactive eras, for instance, as aging Idealists despair about the seeming amorality of the upcoming Reactive generation. Idealists who, as adolescents, bemoaned the moral conventionality and complacency of their Adaptive elders may, paradoxically, look back two generations with nostalgia -- or forward, two generations ahead to the very young -- to the orderly, predictable world of the Civics.)
Kohlberg's model makes a sharp distinction between content and process that needs to be explained at the outset. Moral content is what you believe to be right or wrong in a given situation or with regard to a given behavior. While this is the usual focus of conventional moral education, Kohlberg is not particularly interested in that question as such. His interest is in an exploration of moral process, that is, how (the means by which) people come to make moral judgments -- how they arrive at, and/or how they justify or defend, their moral conclusions.
Kohlberg claims (though, later in this unit, we'll critique this claim, because one can without too much difficulty poke holes in it) that content and process are, or can be seen as, independent. That is, in his view, what one believes (mental content) tells you nothing about how s/he came to that view; and knowing how a person thinks (mental processes) tells you nothing about what conclusions s/he has drawn or will draw by means of those processes. Thus, it's impossible to classify a person into one of Kohlberg's stages (see below) by knowing what their moral values are; the classification is based on an analysis of how they arrived at those values, the ways in which they think about morality.
Kohlberg studies moral process by posing what he calls moral dilemmas to subjects. A moral dilemma is a situation that pits two sets of moral values against one another, making it difficult to know what the obviously right choice would be. A classic example is that of the man whose wife was deathly ill with a very rare disease. The only possible cure was the administration of an expensive experimental drug. Because the drug was so new, his insurance company would not pay for it. The local pharmacist agreed to provide him with a sufficient supply of the drug, but only at the price of $50,000 (an exorbitant price far above the actual cost, most of which would line the pockets of the pharmacist). The man didn't have that kind of money and wasn't able to borrow it, so finally in desperation he broke into the pharmacy and stole the drug. Was he morally justified or not? Again Kohlberg is not interested in whether people answer "yes" or "no" (content), but only in how they justify the correctness of their answer (process). Based on the kind of justifications they offer, Kohlberg attempts to classify subjects into one of six stages of moral development.
Each grouping of two adjacent stages (1st and 2nd, 3rd and 4th, 5th and 6th) can be grouped into larger, more superordinate categories called preconventional, conventional, and postconventional moral reasoning respectively. Preconventional moral reasoners are not yet aware of (or, at least, have not yet gotten to the point of factoring in or being governed by) social, legal, and moral conventions. Conventional moral reasoners are governed by them, but have not yet realized that (sometimes) they can and should be questioned. Postconventional moral reasoners are governed by an ethic that is higher than mere social convention (though at times it can and does lead to the same behaviors as the social conventions).
Here is a snapshot summary of the six stages and how a person might argue for, or against, stealing the drug (in the moral dilemma outlined above) on the basis of moral reasoning drawn from that stage.
Preconventional Stages
(unaware of, or not at all governed by, social conventions)
Stage 1: Hedonistic Orientation
Morality = what I want or what makes me feel good
Pro: The man should steal the drug because he wants it.
Con: The man should not steal the drug because he will feel bad later (and feeling bad is something he does not want).
Stage 2: Punishment Orientation
Morality = What will not be punished
Pro: The man should steal the drug because if he doesn't his wife will hate (punish) him.
Con: The man should not steal the drug because he might get caught (punished) by the police.
Conventional Stages
(governed by social conventions)
Stage 3: Naive Reciprocity Orientation
Morality = What leads to a personal exchange of favors
Pro: The man should steal the drug because when he needs something from his wife later on she will do that for him.
Con: The man should not steal the drug because he might need a favor from the druggist later.
Stage 4: Law and Order Orientation
Morality = What is legal or socially conventional
Pro: The man should steal the drug because men are supposed to take care of their wives no matter what.
Con: The man should not steal the drug because stealing is against the law. [Note: at this level, stealing would not be wrong if there were no law against it. The reference is not to a higher, transcendent or superordinate moral authority as it would be at higher levels, only to what society says is right or wrong. However, unlike at Level 2, if stealing is illegal, it is wrong even if one can get away with it -- even if one can avoid punishment.]
Postconventional Stages
(aware of social conventions, but evaluates them in terms of a higher standard of some kind)
As a test of your understanding, find a copy of the Declaration of Independence and see if you can spot the level 5 and level 6 arguments contained in that document. Most of the arguments are at level 5 (which is, Kohlberg says, the "official" philosophical basis for the legal system of the United States), but there are a few level 6 arguments contained in that document as well. Can you find them? Email me your analysis of this issue for 2 extra credit points.
Stage 5: Social Contract Orientation
Morality = What free human beings have mutually agreed it should be, to mutually benefit society
(laws that are no longer mutually beneficial are not morally binding, hence social conventions can be criticized on this basis)
Pro: The man should steal the drug because most people would agree that family relationships (the wife) are more important than purely economic or business ones (the pharmacist). Society depends on the family more.
Con: The man should not steal the drug because society would ultimately fall apart if everyone just took what they wanted when they wanted it. Society relies on a foundation of respect for private property even when this leads to excesses in individual situations.
Stage 6: Universal or Internalized Moral Principles
Morality = Universal, transcultural, or transcendent ethical standards, such as religious or philosophical absolutes, or intrinsic morality (to be at level 6, not level 4, the person must subscribe to these standards for reasons other than the fact that "society says they are correct", if those standards happen to agree with the existing social conventions of the society -- as they often do to some extent)
(social conventions that contravene a higher moral law are not morally binding, though an ethical person will still submit to the social sanctions associated with them; hence social conventions can be criticized on this basis)
Pro: The man should steal the drug because the value of a human life is infinite. The priceless worth of his wife far exceeds the merely finite and replaceable financial cost to the pharmacist. (A level 6 reasoner would probably argue that the man, having saved his wife's life, should then turn himself in and accept the legal penalty for his actions after the fact. See the recent Denzel Washington movie John Q for a Hollywood treatment of this line of thinking.)
Con: The man should not steal the drug because ultimately our integrity is all we have. It is best to act in a principled way and not cheat others, even if we suffer for it and even if they are unjust, because integrity is more important than short-term happiness.
Make sure that you are able to classify moral arguments into one of the six stages (or, at least, into one of the three "superstages") for the exam. Sometimes this is hard to do (interrater reliability in a typical Kohlbergian experiment is deucedly low), but I'll try to make it crystal-clear on the exam.
As you exercise patience with me (as I type in these notes), pick a reason for being patient that fits your stage in Kohlberg's theory:
A constructive critique of Kohlberg's model
Kohlberg's model has been extremely influential in recent decades, and has revolutionized the study of moral development. But it's not without its critics. Here are some of the most frequent criticisms.
The model somewhat confounds content and process despite Kohlberg's claims that it does not. For instance, "liberals" tend to score, on average, about half a stage higher in Kohlberg's scheme than do "conservatives". This should not happen if content (what you think about moral issues) is irrelevant... but it does happen. It probably reflects a bias in the rating scheme, or problems associated with the fact that, in the research lab, people can only defend their moral arguments with words (what else, global thermonuclear war?), and liberal and conservatives tend to use different terminologies to express themselves. So, raters who are more familiar with a subject's terminology are more likely to rate her/him favorably (because they understand more, can relate better, and so forth); if psychologists tend as a group to be more liberal, then this would lead to an implicit liberal bias in the schema. (The alternate hypothesis is that liberals are genuinely more likely to be postconventional moral reasoners, but this vitiates Kohlberg's basic assumption about the independence of content and process). For similar reasons, religious thinkers (if sufficiently sophisticated in their use of terminology) are likely to score slightly higher than irreligious thinkers (note that level 5 is a "secular" morality, while level 6 is a "transcendent" morality).
The model may, in some indirect way, be biased against women in that female subjects tend on average to score about half a stage lower than male subjects. Why? Possibly because males tend to couch their arguments in more impersonal terms, while females tend to couch their arguments more in personal terms. Again a language bias may cause male terminology to sound more "sophisticated" (at least to male raters) for reasons outlined above. See later material in the course for differences in male vs. female communication and interaction patterns. (Hence, a religious male Democrat might end up scoring significantly higher on Kohlberg's schema than an irreligious female Republican, but the system is supposed to be content-neutral or viewpoint-neutral.)
The model is inherently elitist because, unlike the stage theories we've encountered earlier in this course (e.g., Piaget, Erikson), not everyone reaches the last stage(s). Kohlberg's research shows clearly that a large proportion of American adults never move beyond stage 4, and that only a vanishingly small percentage reach stage 6. (In fact, in his earliest formulations, Kohlberg postulated a seventh stage which only a handful of persons in all of human history -- including, of course, himself -- had reached.) Like similar models (Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs comes to mind), a theory that posits that most adults never reach the pinnacle is inherently elitist. For more on the dangers of intellectual elitism, read anything by Christopher Lasch.
The system lacks objectivity -- for instance, inter-rater reliabilities are notoriously low. A system that can't be applied objectively and consistently, or that is notoriously cumbersome, is not the most useful and practical system that could be devised.
The system focuses on moral reasoning, not moral behavior, yet in the real world our concern surely is focused on the latter -- not what people think, but what they do. Unfortunately, correlations between Kohlberg's stages and real-world moral behavior are notoriously low. It is true that preconventional reasoners (stages 1 and 2) do tend to act in self-serving, morally questionable ways; few adults stay stuck in these childlike patterns of thought and action. But it's difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate conventional from postconventional reasoners in terms of their outward behavior alone. So does the distinction really matter in a practical way?
The content-process distinction may hide a philosophical bias, namely, that content does not matter (or that "one set of moral values is just as good as another"). Time prohibits a full discussion of postmodernism and its links to moral relativism here, but since 09/11/01, most Americans are suddenly much less willing to say that all moral systems are equivalent or that "imposing" morality on others is inherently objectionable.
For further thoughts about religion and postconventionality (from one who happens to be a person of faith, that's me -- doesn't have to be you), click here.
More about generational cyclicity and moral reasoning
Without meaning to give you an overdose of Strauss and Howe's model, I think it's important to reiterate (again) that one of the weaknesses of many of the stage theories discussed in this class is that they were developed during a particular time in history -- and mostly tested on individuals of a particular generational cohort. Thus, they may lack generalizability across generations. For instance, Erikson was a Civic, so his model works best in describing the life course of Civics. Kohlberg was an early-stage Idealist, so his model may best fit the moral development of Idealists. And so forth.
Here are some thoughts about how the four generational cohorts may differ in terms of dealing with moral considerations.
Idealist generations (e.g., born 1943-1960) -- come of age in a time of spiritual awakening
Adolescence to rising adulthood: Reacting against what they perceive as the bland social conformism of their parents (mostly Adaptives), Idealists are typically motivated by radical transformism of some sort -- a break with what are perceived as bland social structures that are devoid of intrinsic meaning. Often, young Idealists' approach to life is defined by a personally transforming experience that leads to an (inward, if not outward) radical break with the recent past (the outer-driven world of their parents), though sometimes it means a radical return to neglected values of the more distant past (often, to the values of a previous Idealist generation). Values and ideals are central. A core motivation is to transform society (beginning with internal transformation).
Rising adulthood to midlife: Driven by the fire and passion of their intrinsic ideals, young Idealist adults can easily clash with peers who hold different and opposing values with equal strength and intensity. Social consensus begins to collapse, and the marketplace of ideas and values becomes increasingly polarized, even balkanized. The civility and compromise of the previous era, so dear to Adaptive adults, is now viewed by Idealists as a form of hypocrisy or uncommitted conformism.
Midlife to elderhood: In later life (which is when Idealists typically make their best contributions, having achieved enough balance to attend sufficiently to the outer pragmatic world), Idealists often become the "Grey Champions" or the guardians of the moral values of society. Paradoxically, they are sometimes perceived as rigid moralists by younger persons who fail to see the inner fire within that motivates them. (Note how Prohibition-type social movements typically occur when Idealists are older adults: the current increasingly anti-smoking climate of contemporary society may be an example.) The typical elder Idealist would be shocked that others see him or her as a Puritan, when s/he still sees her/himself as a contra mundum revolutionary!
Reactive generations (e.g., born 1961-1981) -- come of age in the aftermath of a spiritual awakening (inner-driven era)
Adolescence to rising adulthood: Reacting against what they perceive as childhood neglect resulting from the excessive idealism and narcissism of their parents (mostly Idealists), Reactives are typically motivated by pragmatic survivalism -- making it in a world that they perceive (with some justification) as hostile to, or uncaring about them, or at least a world that has left them to their own devices, forced them to "raise themselves". Seeing the world as a Darwinian, "dog-eat-dog" jungle, young Reactives often view the ideals of their parents as hopelessly out of touch with the harsh, cold realities of life. Often they define themselves as the "true realists" who "know what life is really all about". While sometimes outwardly cynical about morality, in fact young Reactives do have a moral code of their own -- a "culture of honor" or code duello style morality that emphasizes the attainment of status through competition and material success.
Rising adulthood to midlife: Often feeling confined by the "creeping moralism" (as they see it) of society, they may react with a strong emphasis on tangible, material success as a counterpoint. They may seek a life of conspicuous consumption, of blatant hedonism, of a search for Hemingway-style excitement, or of high-risk, high-reward economic or vocational success. Doing (not talking or thinking) is their watchword. They may, however, feel caught between the "positive" values of their elders (Idealists) and their children (Civics) and may begin to feel like -- as the previous Reactive generation actually labeled themselves in the 1920's -- a "lost" generation.
Midlife to elderhood: If they rise to the looming secular crisis, they may become the effective Patton-style leaders -- getting results even if means breaking all the rules. If not, they may age poorly, and feel as devalued by their Civic juniors as they felt they were by their Idealist elders. Yet, as prototypical survivors, they may continue to define success in terms of realism and continuing to fight the battle of life on a day by day basis.
Civic generations (e.g., born 1982-2002; or, those still living born before 1927) -- come of age in a time of secular crisis
Adolescence to rising adulthood: Reacting against what they perceive as the isolationism, pathological individualism, and needless rebellion of their parents (mostly Reactives), they early see the importance of collective action, banding together in the face of the emerging external threat. Moral debates begin to be seen as a luxury that a threatened society cannot afford, so there is increasing social consensus and a notion that social deviance (the hallmark of youthful Idealists) presents a social risk at a time when everyone has to "pull together". Heroic, collaborative doers from youth on, Civics tend to make their best contributions early -- as when the previous Civic generation fought and won World War II.
Rising adulthood to midlife: Civics carry their technocratic, rationalistic, outwardly focused, team-minded approach into their middle years, turning their energies to building a strong society. Often they are unequalled at achieving the impossible -- conquering diseases, putting a man on the moon -- especially if technological solutions are tenable. Since moral and spiritual crises do not seem central (such issues were "resolved once for all" by the handling of the previous secular crisis, often viewed as a "war to end all wars" or some such), it is presumed that a society of purely rational persons will naturally behave in a civil, ethical fashion.
Midlife to elderhood: Aging Civics probably view with dismay the "inexplicable" moral rebellion of the young Idealists who are beginning to dominate the youth culture. Fear that all that they have built will be "swept away" in the coming spiritual awakening, they may retrench, or attempt to build an outer legacy that will survive their passing. Usually they are willing to leave the philosophical questions to a younger generation as long as they feel that the external (economic or technocratic) contributions they have made remain secure or in their hands.
Adaptive generations (e.g., born 1927-1942; or, the new crop of babies to be born in 2003 and following) -- come of age in the aftermath of a secular crisis (outer-driven era)
Adolescence to rising adulthood: Reacting against what they perceive as having been born "too late" to do any great things as their parents (mostly Civics) did, Adaptives tend not to rebel outwardly -- for one thing, they have it too good, having been significantly overprotected as children. Instead, they attempt to consolidate the gains their Civic elders won for them through their "blood, sweat, and tears" by means of political and legislative activities -- consistent with their core motive of egalitarian compromise. Often young Adaptives are highly politically motivated -- but desire to work within the system, not to work outside it (or rebuild it along different lines) as young Idealists might.
Rising adulthood to midlife: As consummate negotiators, mediators, and legislative systematizers, Adaptive adults may have a nagging sense that their contributions are "insignificant" next to the "world-saving sacrifices" of their Civic elders, however, and probably underestimate the worth of their quieter contributions by a notable margin. They bring a sense of civility to the political process that is rare in any other generation. "Politics is the art of the possible" is a common Adaptive sentiment, and tends to be quite opaque to other generations. (Idealists, for instance, would much rather hold stubbornly to an unattainable ideal or a philosophic absolute, whether or not it is politically feasible. Interestingly, the word "compromise" has positive connotations for the average Adaptive -- it means civility, reasonableness, tolerance -- and negative connotations for the average Idealist, for whom it suggests a failure to hold to core principles, a lack of conviction and commitment, and perhaps even hypocrisy or insincerity.) As the "Man In The Grey Flannel Suit" generation, they are skilled at working within established social structures, less motivated either to construct them (as Civics do), critique or possibly destroy them (as Idealists do), or ignore them as irrelevant (as Reactives do).
Midlife to elderhood: Just as Reactives are most at risk of "aging badly", so Adaptives tend to age well, even though they tend to be underrated as social leaders and may be at their best in behind-the-scenes, second-in-command roles. (Note that no U.S. President was elected from the most recent Adaptive generation -- we went right from the last Civic president, George Bush Sr., to the first Idealist president, Bill Clinton -- but the most effective advisors and cabinet members of the past 20 to 30 years have all been Adaptives.) They may view the radical transformism of the upcoming Idealists with some alarm, but are as likely to treat it with a degree of bemused detachment, believing that good will, tolerance, civility, and the art of compromise will ultimately prevail. Often they are right, though sometimes (as in the aftermath of the Civil War) they are desperately and tragically wrong.
Note how difficult it is for any generation to view their next-elders objectively and compassionately! As I write, my own narratives above are doubtless colored by my own experience as a middle-stage Idealist, for whom the Idealist life cycle seems natural and normal, but for whom the previous (Adaptive) and following (Reactive) cycles seem particularly opaque, strange, even abhorrent. (With age has come some degree of wisdom, however, and I can now -- as I did not 20 years ago -- see the inherent value in these styles of life, as important to the overall balance of cultural history as is my own.) What each generation most prizes, the following generation may tend (especially in the years of adolescent rebellion) to despise or disparage. Thus each phase in history is characterized by the neglect of one important set of values, those captured by the cohort that is either too young or too old to effectively advocate it. As I write, the inherent civility, tolerance, and ability to compromise that are the strengths of the aging Adaptive generation (youngest Adaptive elder is now 60, oldest is 75) are beginning to pass from the scene. Look for an increasing polarization, if not balkanization, of our culture as a result. This is why society is best served if the pending secular crisis does not come too soon; if it comes before midlife Idealists have been sufficiently mellowed by experience and the wisdom of age, it can be apocalyptic in tone and scope, as was the Civil War. If this happens in our more technologically advanced day, it could mean World War III -- but I'm hoping that Osama bin Laden holds off long enough that this won't be the case. Secular crises that come when Idealists are old enough to be elder statespersons, not midlife firebrands, usually turn out much better.
Delay of gratification and metacognition
In typical studies of children's ability to delay gratification, children are offered a choice between a small immediate reward and a larger deferred (promised) award: "You can have one marshmallow right now, or if you wait until I get back, you can have five." Children are left alone in an observation room (observed through a one-way mirror) with the single treat to see what percentage of children at various ages wait for the deferred reward, how long the typical child at a given age can wait, and what strategies children use to make waiting psychologically feasible. Children are asked afterwards to describe ways in which they attempted to wait or how (if they did) they succeeded in waiting. Three general kinds of metacognitive strategies are typically mentioned by children (also work for adults, by the way):
1. Distraction: "I tried to think about something else", "I set the candy aside so I couldn't look at it", "I kept busy by playing with a toy."
2. Reframing: "I told myself the candy was probably stale", "I reminded myself that if I ate the candy now, I wouldn't be able to brush my teeth and might get a cavity", "I thought about a time I ate too much candy and got sick".
3. Focus on the long term: "I thought about how much I'd enjoy the five candies if I waited", "I imagined how happy the teacher would be if she saw that I waited", "I kept counting to five in my mind".
(Unit 9b -- peer interactions and friendship -- is covered here.)
Study Guide:
1. Discuss possible links between the generational model of history and cultural attitudes toward moral education.
2. Explain what is meant by the content-process distinction in Kohlberg's model. How does his "moral dilemmas" methodology make use of that distinction?
3. Summarize the six stages of Kohlberg's theory. Be able to classify moral arguments into the appropriate stage. How do preconventional, conventional, and postconventional moral arguments differ?
4. Discuss critiques of Kohlberg's theory.
5. Discuss three metacognitive strategies children utilize to delay gratification.