Current Shape of China's Military

Chinese Military Spending Simulation

Internal & Border Issues  of China

The People's Liberation Army, or PLA, under control of the Communist Party, wrested control of China from the Nationalists, and have always been directed by the Chinese Communist Party. This is a "party army" which took over the government, and is governed by the Central Military Committee of the Party (a more recent state Central Military Committee was created and a power debate may ensue).

Major debates about the shape and function of the army took place repeatedly between Maoists and Professionals.  The latter lost, but their spokespersons were not killed; they were  sent away from the centre. Gradually they would make their way back, so the same people suddenly appeared again making the same argument.  After Mao's death, the Maoist position declined.  

• Based on assumption that in the near future a major power (US, Russia, Japan) would invade and try to subjugate China.  The correct doctrine was to "suck the foreign forces in,"  to challenge the invaders with sheer numbers in a protracted war of attrition, and to move  the capital of China  from place to place.  
• The army should be large, but did not need to be fully equipped with modern technological weapons.  
• The Army would  modernize and develop China.  It would not be parasitic--the Army would grow its own food, make its own uniforms and weapons. The troops would help build dams, weed fields, harvest crops; its medical units would provide basic medical services in the area surrounding the base. 
• The military would socialize and modernize individuals.  To that end, peasantry and non-Han were disproportionately recruited.
• Mao believed that the most critical element in modernization and defense was for people to have the "right" thought, spirit, and beliefs.  (Example:  having soldiers learn and quote Mao's "Little Red Book") 
• A critical component of military role was constabulary--to put down rebellions, insurgencies, and demonstrations which could not be controlled by the police.  

Strategic attack was not imminent;  the PLA no longer needed to prepare for "an early war, major war and nuclear war or total war."  [zhaoda, daoda, da hezhanzheng, dazhan, zhongtizhan}  The Army was to prepare for a "limited war" or "local war" [youxian zhanzheng or jubu zhanzheng]

The army was  drastically cut   with large numbers moved to the  People's Armed Police (a paramilitary to quell civil disturbances).  Older tanks and weapons would be used by the PAP.

Note of importance:  According to Mulvern and  Yang,  some 73% of defense budget goes to the PLA, only 10% to the Navy and 17% to the Air Force.  (Nuclear forces and missiles are within the PLA's Second Artillery.)  The Air Force and Navy, less essential for internal political control, have command echelons of military with expertise, and less Party penetration. The PLA, essential for control--and the greatest threat to political authorities--has had greatest penetration by the Party.  

Given the importance of science and technology, and their costs,  Rapid Reaction Units (RRU; also called "fists") and special force units were created--"pockets of excellence"  with greater coordination of land, air and sea forces. 

The Army was re-organized (but old habits die hard.  War games frequently mean separate units meet in one area, each "doing their own thing.") Greater coordination is possible in the RRU and special forces.  The effort to transfer military industries to the Centre (thereby reducing the financial independence of units) was not altogether successful.  Units plundered the industries before transfer, and challenged Jiang's control.  

Shambaugh also notes that "none of the senior Communist Party leaders has any military background."  ("China's Post-Deng Military Leadership," in China's Military Faces the Future, Lilley and Shambaugh, ed., pp. 11-32. Washington, DC: ME Sharpe, 1999.) 

This means that military advice carries greater weight in policy debates.  It also means that in crisis, the military is more likely to take the action it wishes, and inform Beijing later.    

On June 31, 2003, Stratfor.com intelligence service posted: 

1135 GMT – CHINA: Because of China's military advances, the country now has the ability to launch a surprise attack on Taiwan and keep U.S. forces in the region at bay, a Pentagon report released July 30 said. The report also indicated that China was pursuing a strategy to attack Taiwan. China currently has 450 short-range missiles in the Nanjing Military Region across the Taiwan straits that are capable of attacking Taiwan -- and possibly U.S. targets in the region. The report also said China's military exercises are increasingly focused on a possible clash with the United States. The Pentagon estimates that China's defense budget is $45 billion to $65 billion, as opposed to the $20 billion China announced in 2002.

How to interpret this?  Is it a typical budget-politics posting by the Pentagon to obtain greater funding? Or an accurate assessment of changed military beliefs by the militarists in China?

Andrew Scobell. China and Strategic Culture, Scroll down past summary to bring up entire article.  Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2002.

Charles F. Hawkins, THE FOUR FUTURES:  Competing Schools of Military Thought inside the PLA (Taiwan Security Research)

Michael D. Swaine & Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (RAND, 2000), 

• For Intro courses: Ch 4; 
  •  also useful - Summary, Conclusions
• For upper-level: entire (long; print chapter by chapter)

Ying Ma. China's America Problem, from Policy Review, Feb 02.  

Larry M. Wortzel, CHINA'S MILITARY POTENTIAL (Oct 2, 1998).  Within this site is an abstract, and you'll then need to scroll down and bring up the paper itself (in Adobe Acrobat).

 Remember when the US spy plane, the EP-3 was shot down in the South China sea, and made a forced landing in Hainan?  April 2001?  AP Photograph by Ronen Zillberman

The Chinese were testing their new submarine, rumored to be very quiet.  The EP-3 was trying to pick up signals, when Chinese planes buzzed  and one collided with it.  It took weeks for Beijing political authorities to learn what really happened.  The officers in Hainan had sent misleading and incorrect information to their political superiors.  They had not sought approval to shoot down the US plane from their political masters.  

The Chinese thoroughly explored the electronic capabilities before allowing the crew to leave;  the plane was dismantled and crated because the Chinese would not let if fly.  EP-3 photo from Navy via AP.