Transformation of the DEA:

Factors in Change and Immobility

Prepared for the National Social Science Association Conference

San Antonio, Nov. 5-7, 1997

Prof. Angela S. Burger, Political Science

University of Wisconsin Colleges: Marathon

Wausau, 54403

aburger@uwc.edu

From 1930, the focus of successive drug enforcement agencies has ostensibly and publicly remained the same: to disrupt major trafficking organizations. To this end, agencies claimed the value of cooperating with other agencies to investigate, arrest and make prosecutable cases against the kingpins. The latter has always been a matter of dispute. However, Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1930-1968) did appear to target organized crime networks moving drugs. cooperating with other agencies to investigate, arrest and make prosecutable cases against the kingpins. However no matter what successor drug agencies stated as their goals in testimony before Congressional committees and in their own publications, there is evidence that raise serious questions about those claims are not accurate.

From the statistical data and testimony presented to Congressional Subcommittees on Appropriations, and other oversight committees, we see statistical evidence of a domestic strategy directed towards the ends of the tentacles, not the head. James Mills, in his 1986 study documents the value of drug-lord conspiracy cases while recording the elimination of the program from DEA.[i] In 1990 former career agent of DEA, John Levine, provides details from the field to show the difficulty of obtaining permission from top officials in DEA to pursue major organizations, of the pressure to end cases at a lower level.[ii] Woolner’s 1994 study of the massive drug-money-laundering case describes the orientation within the agency:

But at DEA, money-laundering probes clashed with the prevailing culture. This was a kick-down-the-door kind of agency, not a place where folks got their thrills from following numbers from one document to another. It was dominated by agents who believed the best cocaine investigations were the ones that put the most powder on the table. A DEA supervisor in New York expressed that commonly held view when, during a discussion of whether to launch a money-laundering investigation, he turned to an agent and asked him to pull out his credentials. The agent produced his badge and the supervisor read it aloud: “’Drug Enforcement Administration.’ Do you see the word `money’ on this?”[iii]

Woolner provides a DEA agent’s comparison of the FBI and DEA, then an FBI agent’s view of the two:

I like to think of the Bureau as corporate law enforcement. And DEA is just full of cowboys. DEA investigations are “much more independent and spontaneous.”

The people at FBI like to say they go for the long-term approach to an investigation, whereas a “buy-bust” mentality permeates DEA, where the typical case involves an undercover agent buying a kilogram or two of cocaine and arresting the seller.[iv]

The problem we investigate is intriguing. When did the organization change its direction and focus, and why? Why haven’t successive DEA officials, Congress and the Executive Branch, been able to pressure the agency to return to its original and preferred mission? Why has the organization been willing to see its share of the national budget on drug enforcement drop from 79% to less than half of expenditures? To see other agencies acquire part of their mission? Why didn’t it “protect its turf”? These questions are the focus of this study.

The framework for investigation draws on the organizational approach model of the three Graham Allison decisional models.[v] The focus of this paper is the central drug enforcement agency, by whatever name, about which little has been written (an exception is McWilliams, 1990). We have to tease out what happened within the agencies from a limited array of sources, principally Congressional committee investigations, the organizations’ own reports and publications, a few first-hand and second-hand analyzes which deal with the agencies in question. .

This study is not on US drug policy or the making of , or consequences of, those policies., which have been the subject of numerous very fine studies by Musto 1983, Cloyd 1982, Bellis 1981, Kinder 1991, McWilliams 1991, Whitebread 1974, Sloman 1979, Kaplan 1983, Sharp, Baum 1996.[vi] Most of these studies of drug policy utilize the political bargaining model (whether the authors are aware of it or not). Most analyzes of drug policy suggest the primacy of the political bargaining model in examining drug enforcement agencies. The argument reads like this: the ills of the organization (currently DEA) stem from the politicization of the drug war by elected politicians, and their appointees, especially those in the White House. The analyzes of Baum, Epstein, Marshall, Scott, and Sharp,[vii] although they do not focus on the DEA itself, provide ample support for policy changes tied to electoral cycles and foreign policy goals. Martin F. Pera of the DEA, testifying before a Senate subcommittee in 1976 emphasized the impact of politicization on the organization. [viii] From these analyzes, one could infer that the change within the organization was due to external forces.

Organizations, however, are rarely passive entities. They do not necessarily change dramatically because of external political pressures, nor do they respond obediently to directives from the superiors in their own organization.[ix] Indeed, if organizations did comply to pressures from both, the drug agencies would still concentrate on the major traffickers. We need to try to ferret out what happened within the organization as its members attempted to control and shape the institution, its rules, and its character.

The questions we ask: when did the change in direction occur? Why did it occur? What seems to have happened within the organization? What was the profound change that prevented successive DEA leaders, the Congress and President from “changing it back”? Why didn’t the organization obey the basic rule of protecting its turf?

When Did the Change in Orientation Occur?

Perusal of available data directs us to a period from 1968 to 1976. By the end of their two-year investigation, 1975-76, it was apparent to Senators and DEA officials that significant changes had occurred.[x] Let us examine why this period was a logical one for profound changes.

Reorganizations

During this period the agency was reorganized twice. Under the best of conditions reorganization can be disturbing for officials, agents, and staff. The evidence suggests both reorganizations were traumatic.

The first reorganization merged entities from two departments and put the new agency in a third. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1930-1968, with 309 agents) from Treasury, was merged with the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (325 investigators) which was in HEW’s Food and Drug Administration. The FBN dealt with heroin, cocaine and marijuana; the BDAC dealt with psychedelic drugs such as LSD, amphetamines, barbituates and designer drugs. The new Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) was placed in the Justice Department in 1969. The BNDD had one director, an outsider to the agencies involved, who brought with him other outsiders at the top levels.

The change in departments meant the agency reported to new and different Congressional Committees and Appropriation subcommittees. The Appropriations subcommittee on the Treasury had a laudatory view of the FBN, rarely if ever criticized it, appreciated its frugality and often expressed the desire to give them more than they had asked.

The new subcommittee was far more critical; it was accustomed to analyzing the FBI, and used that knowledge as a basis of comparison. The subcommittee chair, John Rooney, trying to come to grips with the new agency, calculated that each BNDD arrest apparently cost the government $18,600, expressed shock that 1,078 agents had arrested only 1875 traffickers, or little more than 1 arrest per agent, asked why arrests were only 44% of arrests of the prior year, why they wanted a quarter of a million dollars for informants when the FBI was satisfied with $70,000, and why it was that Customs seized most of the illicit narcotics. In his first appearance before the new Appropriations subcommittee, director John Ingersoll could not answer many of the questions asked, nor could he justify amounts requested. That a member of his agency had written the Chair claiming Ingersoll was wasting money on plush headquarters did not help. Ingersoll revealed that Treasury and HEW had retained most of the records of the two agencies. He explained the decline in arrests by his orders for the regions to make studies of the drug trafficking organizations so that they could target the major traffickers; apparently no such data existed from the FBN period.[xi]

What we see here is a “new” agency, bereft of its historic moorings. The leaders came from outside the agency, and did not find it easy to obtain fundamental knowledge about the pre-existing agencies, their cultures, and strengths—although the weaknesses soon became apparent. Not having the files was a problem, for the central office was exceptionally small, with most personnel out in the field. Ingersoll did not realize the “passion for frugality” that had been instilled in agents, and may not have understood that his actions antagonized the old hands. The outsiders built up training facilities, but, perforce, could not pass on agency culture. Out in the regions, the former agents could elect to go their own way, but might have experienced difficulty in absorbing so many newcomers. Plus, the physical move to larger offices could have modified some of the older patterns of communication. The agents and staff might have easily resented the criticisms by the new Director (ordering a study rather than urging agents on to action), and by the new Appropriations subcommittee.

In 1973 four discrete entities were combined into the Drug Enforcement Agency. One was the BNDD. Two organizations set up by President Nixon in his EOP were added: the Organization for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE), and the Office of National Narcotic Intelligence (ONNI). In an effort to end the virulent conflict between Customs and the drug agencies, some 500 Customs Agents who dealt with drugs became the fourth element. (Nixon’s SAODAP (Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention) under which clinics were established to provide methadone for heroin addicts was shifted into ADAMHA (Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Agency) within HHS. The BNDD, ODALE and Customs had three distinct missions and operational styles:

· BNDD focused on major trafficking organizations, and had offices in a few major cities. Anslinger had fought long and hard to put agents abroad to gather intelligence, and make cases—for years, Customs had thwarted the effort. The BNDD wanted to “convoy” illicit drugs through borders in order to track them to and through the major traffickers. That is how they could target and disrupt networks. Customs did not want to allow “convoys” and endeavored to stop them at every turn. The friction between the two agencies resulted in the loss of a substantial number of cases (20%).

· The drug officials of Customs had the mission of stopping drugs at the border, and had had international agents to alert them to hot cargo. The goal was not to make conspiracy cases domestically. In 1969 they had lost their 19-20 overseas Customs drugs officials to BNDD, and claimed that virtually all information about incoming drugs ceased with that transfer. Most of the illegal drugs interdicted were due to alert Customs officials. Once the drug agency had been moved from Treasury to Justice, the disputes between Customs and narcotics had to be resolved by the White House, rather than the the Secretary of the Treasury. Note that the Customs Officials were not asked if they wanted to move to DEA, but were summarily informed of the transfer.

· ODALE, the Organization for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, had been proposed by Myles Ambrose of Customs. The purpose was an organization which would work with local police to stop drug distribution at the street level. ODALE’s activities would indeed show to Americans that Nixon’s promises about getting tough on crime and drugs were being carried out. President Nixon placed effective control over the organization within the Executive Office of the President, and put Ambrose at its head. ODALE was set up for 18 months, just enough time to carry it through the 1972 elections. Its personnel came from other agencies, with more than 250 from BNDD.

ODALE is remembered for the several incidents in which groups of agents burst into houses at night, terrorizing the inhabitants, only to find that they were at the wrong address. The series of hearings held around the US by the Senate subcommittee on Reorganization Plan No. 2, revealed the deep differences between ODALE and BNDD officials. All BNDD officials spoke of the need for the federal government to concentrate on the top trafficking networks. All ODALE spokesmen testified in words very similar to those of Jose Martinez, the regional director of ODALE in Atlanta. He spoke approvingly on the primary goal—stopping street sales of narcotics. He claimed that people can’t understand the impact of apprehending a kingpin. Pushers have multiple sources of supply, so “initially it makes no difference to the people on the street. What they do understand is that if their children know who all the narcotics violators are in a particular neighborhood, they cannot understand why the police departments do not do something about it or the Federal Government does not do something about it.” [xii]

·ONNI, by contrast, was a data-collecting agency.

The Senate subcommittee heard varied testimony around the country. For every instance in which local authorities testified they were breaking off cooperation with ODALE because of felt deficiencies, there were others who claimed their experiences with BNDD were “not rewarding.” There was mixed reaction to forming DEA. In every city, officials reported the unbelievable amounts of money federal drug agents had to spend.

This second reorganization, in 1973, was also traumatic. In its first three years, the agency had 3 directors (now called Administrator). The first, John Bartels, Jr., who came from ODALE, was asked to resign in May, 1975. Two high officials, one from the old FBN and the other from Customs had complained to the Dy. Attorney General of several actions or policies of Bartels, including impeding integrity investigations. The investigation of their complaints led to a finding that the charges were without substantial foundation, to the assignment of the two whistleblowers to other positions in Justice, and then to the demand that the Administrator resign (not for concerns about integrity, but for poor management skills). The resignation took place May 30, and was followed by a Senate subcommittee investigation of the DEA which ran from June 1975 to August 1976. The interim Administrator served for 6-7 months, during the investigation, and was followed by a third Administrator, from outside the agency, who testified near the end of the Senate inquiry. These were turbulent times.

Part of the difficulty stemmed from civil service rules and practices of earlier years. FBN employees, unlike those in the FBI, were under civil service. In the 1960’s agent turnover suddenly increased significantly at the higher levels. In 1963 director Giordano diagnosed the problem as stagnation in the lower grades. Agents entered at Grade 7, were promoted to grade 9 after 1 year, and most stayed there. The FBN had only 38% at GS 11 and higher, compared to 88% for Customs, and 70% for Secret Service. Decisions were made to promote more agents to the higher ranks, including the super-grades. When merger came in 1973, the BNDD had 18 supergrades with employees in each; DEA was to have only 16. Customs had none—but their officials were to be merged at all levels.

What was the end result? First, Bartels had no choice in appointing a management team; he was forced to take those with civil service status, regardless. Secondly he did override civil service classifications to place Customs officials as directors of seven regional offices (5 of the most important in the US, and 2 abroad). Given the long-standing friction between Customs and BNDD, those appointments were not likely to have been popular within the larger BNDD population. Third he merged and downsized over a hundred operating entities, many of them duplicative, from the parent agencies. Even though he was creating new district offices, these were in smaller cities and less prestigious.

The initial impact of his actions, necessitated by reorganization, was to increase the competition among the employees in all categories for scarce positions. The GS 18’s found they had to lose their hard-won grades; cuts were “voluntary” but nonetheless hurt. Suddenly the internal politics became zero-sum. The intense controversy swirling around Bartels reflected zero-sum politics.

Furthermore, the civil service regulations limited what could be done by the Administrator to discipline or fire malefactors. Bartels expressed his shock in finding that Civil Service Commission ruled that he could not fire a file clerk who was not only caught smoking marijuana on the job in the national office, but said she planned to continue.[xiii] DEA systematically sent integrity cases to Civil Service, only to find the Commission rejecting them, or reversing administrative discipline. The organization had a problem in “making a good case.” Did these rulings divide the agency into national officials versus rank-and-file? Or did they demoralize staff who had to continue to work side by side with staff charged with such violations?

Growth of the Organization(s)

The extraordinary growth of the drug agencies would be almost sufficient to explain the change in agency culture. To put the change in context, note that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics began with almost 300 agents in 1930, and ended with 309 in 1968. It was a frugal agency, utilizing laboratories and training facilities of other agencies, and ensuring the Congress that it could do its job with a small budget. The total number of employees in 1968 was 482.

In Feb. 1968 the Johnson Administration amended its 1969 budget request to add 115 investigators (of whom 27 would form a new intelligence-gathering unit) and 61 administrative/clerical positions, which was a 36.5% increase. Between 1970 and 1971 it grew 58.6%. By 1976 the agency had grown to 4,263 employees (almost nine-fold). Note from Chart 1, which documents the growth of employees, that, even after the creation of the DEA in 1973, the agency experienced a 68% increase between 1974 and 1975. The budget exploded from $6.7 million in 1968 to $150.8 million in 1976. Growth of this magnitude in the concentrated time frame suggests conditions existed for rapid and not always predictable changes in objectives, goals, and methods, and internal culture.

The physical move to larger offices which occurred not only in Washington, D.C.,but also in the major cities (regional headquarters), undoubtedly disrupted functioning. The creation and staffing of new district offices increased competition, and delayed policy implementation. Setting up or expanding five laboratories, and new training facilities, took time. In the old FBN, with its slow growth, field agents came in to teach courses. Now, field agents did not teach the courses. Outsiders did. The sheer numbers of the newcomers, with their different socialization, was bound to make a difference in the regional and district offices. Power would still be held by the “old hands” because of the civil service rules.

How Did the Organization Change?

“Who’s on First?”

We do not have direct evidence on which elements of the various organizations won the desirable promotions and positions, beyond knowing that 7 regional directorships went to Customs. However there are several factors which suggest that the old FBN/BNDD subset may have played at a disadvantage.

First, charges of corruption against old FBN agents were serious and sustained, and may have tarnished the reputations of the group. The FBN, under Harry Anslinger for more than 30 years, had a very good reputation in his lifetime. McWilliams wrote of a tightly organized, efficient agency staffed with a diverse group of hard-boiled, knowledgeable and committed agents; charges of corruption were few and far between.[xiv]

It was during Giordano’s watch in the late 1960’s that investigations into corruption within the narcotics unit of the New York police department, spiraled into investigations of both prosecutors and FBN agents. . Ingersoll was very critical of the unwillingness of the FBN to deal with the egregious behaviors that were unveiled. He testified that 10 FBN agents had been indicted in criminal cases, others had been tried and were awaiting sentences, administrative charges were pending against two, and 40 had been forced to resign for cause.[xv] Others were reprimanded and relocated; however, where these individuals went, Ingersoll claimed, corruption followed. Some of the charges raised about Bartels rested on promotions of agents who had open integrity cases pending against them (Bartels was able to show that the promotions came before he was appointed Administrator.)

Interim administrator Henry S. Dogin testified that he instituted a policy whereby all promotion and transfer cases had to be screened by the Office of Internal Security.[xvi] Prior to that, the reasoning was that an open but unproven case should not be considered in promotions, or their existence even revealed to those acting on promotions. Partly this was due to the ease of making charges. (Bartels had ended a program where CIA agents, known only to two agency officials, worked as undercover DEA agents, and were able to phone in vague charges about particular agents. Sometimes agents who were indicted or forced to resign named other agents as “dirty.” Often there was no way to clear these cases or to learn the motivations of those who made the charges.[xvii])

Bensinger in 1976 testified that he had taken disciplinary action “up to and including dismissals, on a number of senior managers in this agency—including several GS-15’s, a GS-16 and a GS-18.”[xviii] Additionally, some 22 investigations had been launched against actions by agents in a DEA-Orlando Task Force, with some disciplinary action taken and more expected. He resurrected a policy begun by Ingersoll which put internal Inspection posts on the promotional route; normally these posts were considered dead-end. Few of those in the top ranks had ever dealt with integrity cases.

The 1969-76 period was not one in which it would have been easy for the old FBN/BNDD hands to have established dominance of their objectives, goals, culture, and style, even if the numbers had not grown so explosively.

An additional problem was that the President who had created BNDD felt it necessary to set up not one but three drug-related agencies in the EOP, without prior consultation with the BNDD director. That action sent a strong signal of dissatisfaction with the BNDD, and its approach. The FBN subset may have lost some of their morale and self-esteem. Did this make them more willing to abandon a “kingpin” strategy? Or did it lead them to hunker down in the regions and cities, protecting both themselves and their turf?

By contrast, the BNDD-ODALE contingent may have gained in the power struggles within the DEA. These shared ties and culture with some of the old FBN and the newer BNDD hires. When ODALE and ONNI were merged with BNDD into DEA, the 250 BNDD who had served in ODALE had reason to think that their street-level drug-busting approach was the “Presidents Preferred Policy,” especially when John Bartels Jr., the Dy. Director of ODALE was appointed Administrator.

True, ODALE had earned bad press when ODALE agents broke into the wrong homes. “Collinsville” is the name often used to cover this type of incident, because two such erroneous raids were made on the same night in this Illinois city, and were widely publicized. Similar Incidents occurred elsewhere.

The raids did no lasting damage to ODALE or its agents because of subsequent events. The Civil Service Commission overruled the 30-day suspension of two of the four agents involved in the Collinsville incident. Two criminal trials brought against the agents involved in raids in two states ended with “not guilty” decisions by juries. The “raided” individuals then sued the agents for violating their civil rights. The Justice Department joined in the suit to defend the agents (a move questioned by Senators). Juries decided in favor of the agents. The agents then sued for libel (without the assistance of the Justice Department) and 8 agents were awarded damages of $15,000 each. The BNDD had held off setting any administrative punishment for fear of affecting the outcome of the trials, but with the verdicts handed down, decided only to transfer the agents to other locations. The high command did, however, force the resignation of the one BNDD official who was seen as the key figure in the raid decision. [xix]

These court and agency decisions served to validate the tactics of ODALE. The decision to transfer and spread these agents may have given them greater prestige when they were vindicated.

What about Customs? Customs Officials did become regional directors in five prized locations domestically and two abroad. Charges that they had been passed over were refuted with data in 1976. Customs officials moved to DEA may have been more inclined to ally with BNDD-ODALE than with the older FBN contingent on two grounds. First, the enmity with FBN was long-standing, and FBN were more likely to be competitors for prominent positions. Indeed, in 1973 it was logical to put the FBN’s Tartaglino, the highest ranked agent, as Chief of Inspection. Instead George Brosan of Customs was made Acting Chief, out of concern that a Tartaglino appointment would lead to charges of a BNDD take-over, and a massive demand of Customs agents to be allowed to return to Customs. Second, the Customs penchant for busts-at-the-border fits more easily into a street level “powder on the table” tactic than a strategy of making complicated conspiracy cases that spread over time and distance, and involve undercover penetration as well as money-laundering.

Regional Power

The testimony of three top DEA officials (Interim Administrator Dogin, Martin Pera, and Benzinger) attests to a shift of power from the national to the regional offices. Regional directors gained substantial autonomy. According to Dogin, a vigorous and determined executive in the national office could make a difference, but is doubtful that he was able to do so in his few months in office. Benzinger agreed with Senators that regional directors might have too much power, and that it might be wise to to reduce the number of regions. However, he said, more than anything else the organization needed stability. He would make no changes. This decision may explain his difficulties in steering the organization. Another factor making it more difficult to pursue kingpins was the establishment of small district offices in places like Minot, N. Dakota, and Ely, Minn. Few major traffickers have Minot on their regular routes. This was to be expected: in the hearings on Reorganization No. 2, a number of local officials has indicated that most of the traffickers on their level were in category 4, with perhaps a couple in 3. Agents concentrated on traffickers available to them.

Inferring the Change in Culture

The evidence available suggests that shortly after 1973 the DEA became “ODALE-ized” with regional directors and district officials acquiring power, and thence being unwilling to give it up. Focusing on major trafficking organizations would mean providing information and agent-time to other regions, who would get the credit for breaking the illicit organization. Better to concentrate on lower-level traffickers, within the region, and minimize links to other regions. And to promote those who had the best arrest record and the most drugs seized. Some larger-than-city units might be acceptable, such as a “South Florida Task Force” to the Miami office, especially since the Task Forces were seen as the reincarnation of ODALE. The Task Force called for coordination of multiple enforcement agencies plus prosecutors to make large but low-level busts of incoming drugs. Task force budgets commandeered 11% of DEA resources; about 24 were set up. Congressmen protested when, due to inactivity, the DEA wanted to move those resources elsewhere.

Strategy Shifts

The perception that Ingersoll’s particular strategy aimed at targeting trafficking networks had “failed” may have assisted in the ODALE-ization of the DEA. BNDD director Ingersoll’s policy sounded reasonable. He asked agents to thoroughly analyze the major trafficking rings that operated in their respective regions. The study showed 200 individual trafficking systems in the world, with 58 interrelated into 10 major systems with 1000 identifiable individuals. The study estimated that these systems handled 80% of the illicit heroin, and 100% of the cocaine. Each year the agency targeted specific systems for undercover penetration and destruction.[xx] Although the number of arrests were sharply down in 1970, a series of major cases with hundreds of the cases hit at the top of systems.[xxi] After a couple of years, however, Ingersoll evaluated the effects of this strategy: BNDD had disrupted two organizations, but all of them were still functioning. At that point, and perhaps recognizing the power of the regions, he developed another strategy.

The new strategy was named G-DEP (Geographic - Drug Enforcement Policy). Violators of the drug laws were placed in one of four categories, from Class I - major international trafficker, down to Class IV - street-level pusher. The goal was for BNDD to focus on Classes I and II. This classification system was modified over time, but became the standard method to report activity, whether in terms of arrest or workload. As Chart II shows, in 1973 over 91% of DEA arrests were in the two lowest classes : Class III were local distributors, class 4 were street busts. During Benzinger’s tenure, arrests in the lower classes never fell below 75%.

The figures are all the more striking because of the ease in manipulating numbers to move cases from lower to higher ranks. For example, the classification system was based on quantities of the illicit drugs involved, but the national review office which verified the quantity and purity was first gutted then disbanded. Regional offices could classify the cases “upward” with no oversight. And the Administrators stressed the importance of Class I and II cases. That less than 10% of the cases were Class I and II, suggests regional offices had been “ODALE-ized” and were flaunting their autonomy. The abrupt change in 1980, shown in the table, reflects a change in definition of classes. From that point on the agency seems to be delivering what their leaders had been promising.

Program Indicators of Orientation and Direction

Given the much improved arrest records, it is necessary to examine some of the DEA’s programs to try to verify its orientation. Several programs provide clues.

Purchasing Evidence and Information

One concerns the money that was budgeted for PE/PI (Purchase of Evidence, Purchase of Information). Most drug cases involve buying drugs, or paying informants. By 1970, almost $1.5 million was budgeted for PE/PI; by 1976 it had risen to almost $10 million. How was this spent, with what effect, and how much was recovered?

A study of cases in region 14 (San Diego), under John Windham of the DEA revealed that 67% of the funds went to Class III violators (local distributors), and another 7% for Class IV (street pushers). In no case did the purchase lead to that trafficker’s supplier, and in the majority of the files there was no indication of any attempt to identify the source of supply. In no case did it lead to a Class I or Class II violator. The pattern showed that the oft-stated logic of “buying in” and “working one’s way up” to make a case against the inner circles and the kingpin, was false. It didn’t happen. The agent usually made two to four purchases from the Class III violator, then arrested him, with whatever drugs he was carrying at the time. Interviews with agents, office heads and supervisors showed that they knew the “paper policy” of the DEA, but realized that advancement within DEA was predicated “on the number of arrests they made and amounts of narcotics they seized.” Analysis of other locations in that region revealed a similar pattern—that 75% of the monies were spent on Class III and IV cases, and did not lead upward.[xxii]

GAO analysis of PE/PI funds revealed that 99% of the monies expended were not recovered. The purchases added $10 million to the illicit markets. “Critics of this technique, however, question the rationale for a practice which stimulates the market for illicit drugs by adding to the monetary rewards.” [xxiii] (In addition, investigators of the agency, both in 1973 and in 1975-76, were concerned at the temptations placed before agents—the ease of saying they had spent $10,000 for a purchase when it had only been $7,000—and the loose controls over the drugs purchased or seized.) From the 1980’s on, the budget figures folded PE/PI into a broader ”Domestic Enforcement” category, which makes it impossible to discover how much is allocated for these purposes.

Levine’s account of his life as an undercover agent is replete with problems he had in obtaining PE/PI funds for Class I and II traffickers. The advice of superiors, passed on through a liaison official, was to bust the persons they had and not pursue the case further.

The problem of funding may have changed once the asset forfeiture laws came into full play. Participating agencies, bounty hunters, and informants could receive a percentage of the assets. However, Baum tracks the change in DEA from “buy-bust” which was the focus of PE/PI monies, to the even easier “sell-bust.” He reports, for example, that DEA paid one handsome young man some $73,000 for romancing young women, promising to marry them, getting them to take drugs, and then having them arrested and their assets seized.[xxiv] Evidence that these funds were being directed towards the upper levels of trafficking organizations is not to be found in the data available.

State and Local Task Forces

DEA created State and Local Task Forces, which were seen as the reincarnation of ODALE. By 1981-82, these Task Forces had 11% of the investigative workhours of the agency. Task Force arrests were counted in DEA statistics only once, in 1985 for 1983; the total arrests doubled for that year, and the explanatory paragraph said the Task Force arrests are greater in the lower Class III and IV cases than other DEA arrests.[xxv] It can be assumed that usually Task Force arrests appeared in tabulations of State and Local arrests, but it would be difficult to consider all State and Local arrests as a function of the Task Forces. These Task Forces were favorite vehicles for the DEA, and for Congressmen. That they focused on lower echelons indicates that ODALE lived.

What was striking was that the South Florida Task Forces, Customs, Coast Guard, and Defense had to set up their own intelligence centers because the DEA’s EPIC (El Paso Intelligence Center), ostensibly designed to collect and coordinate tactical information about traffickers, narcotics, smuggling, etc., was of little use.[xxvi] It is not clear if the computer programs were not designed appropriately, or if the unit saw its role as monitoring trends rather than providing hot tips. Customs testified they received trend-data and profiles, but never a single tip from EPIC about an incoming shipment. DEA agents abroad kept tips on incoming shipments to itself, even when this meant losing the cargo.[xxvii] The latter might demonstrate the animosity between two competitive organizations. However, the available evidence suggests the DEA did not place great value on tactical intelligence and analysis.

Marijuana Eradication

One sign of the ODALE-ized culture was the response of the DEA when pressured to eradicate domestic marijuana in the 1980’s. The DEA reported destruction of millions of plants, without mentioning that most of it was the low-potency ditchweed (.17% THC compared to 2-3% cultivated cannabis), and included regrowth of ditchweed eradicated the previous year. Director Mullen’s testimony on DEA eradication was disingenuous.[xxviii] The US Attorney and California Attorney-General organized CAMP (Campaign Against Marijuana Production) with officials from several organizations including DEA, to eradicate the potent marijuana in California. Other states followed. This effort could not be left to DEA initiative.

CENTACs and Mobile Task Forces

DEA also created two other groups. The Mobile Task Forces could provide extra resource when and where most needed, either domestically or to assist a foreign government. They targeted more important traffickers, with cooperation of other units of governments.

Even more significant were the CENTACS (Central Tactical Unit), which could follow trails wherever they led to bring down domestic and international trafficking organizations. Federal prosecutors gave high praise to CENTACs for the quality of their cases, which resulted in convictions and heavy penalties. The GAO, usually critical, gave effusive accolades to the CENTAC program and urged its expansion. [xxix] CENTAC incurred only 3% of the investigative resources of the DEA, but had 57% of its indictments in Class I and Class II in 1977. Despite pressures from the Congress and GAO, the DEA adamantly refused to increase the CENTAC program, saying it was at its “optimum level of quantitative productivity.”[xxx] CENTAC’s cases often involved intricate financial dealings, and GAO questioned whether the DEA, with no accountants, were really competent to handle investigations of such complexity. The DEA director claimed they obtained assistance from the IRS and FBI,[xxxi] and after all, gave courses of one week, and one-to-three weeks to all agents. [xxxii] That response did not indicate a willingness to give high priority to major cases.

DEA destroyed CENTAC and the Mobile Task Forces in two moves. First, a new Administrator, “Bud” Mullen, reduced the number of regions from 13 to 5, then in 1982 reorganized on drug-specific lines (i.e., marijuana desk, heroin desk, etc.), within the regions. CENTACs and Mobile Task Forces were replaced by regional Special Enforcement Operations (SEO). The results were comparable to a few regionally-based CENTACs studied by GAO: they were not effective. Woolner provides a fascinating example of the problems with SEO’s: when the Atlanta SEO discovered an organization (La Mina) that claimed to be national, with offices in many cities, the Los Angeles office initially denied the existence of La Mina (how could it exist and we not know about it?). The NY office claimed that their La Mina could not possibly be connected to the La Mina uncovered in Atlanta, even though the NY leader had the same name and same phone number..[xxxiii]

Markedly different interpretations exist over the destruction of CENTAC. Martin Pera of the DEA testified in 1976 that regional directors did not like CENTAC, would not cooperate with it, and deliberately limited the career advancement of any agent who worked with CENTAC. He claimed multiple sources from the regions, who emphasized the importance there of number of cases and quantities of drugs seized. Top enforcement managers at DEA “told me the CENTAC effort should show for cosmetic purposes in the organization but the responsibility for moving this program forward should go back to the field because the centralization was getting certain regional directors irritated.”[xxxiv]

James Mill, who wrote a detailed account of CENTAC operations, put forth the interpretation by agents in CENTAC: namely that the FBI did not invent it, and the FBI therefore killed it. Their reference was to the appointment of Jack Lawn, formerly of the FBI, as Acting Deputy Administrator in 1982, and then Administrator in 1985. It is not at clear if Lawn played any role in killing CENTAC; Francis “Bud” Mullen, Jr., was the Administrator from 1981 to 1985.

Targeting Drug Lords with the FBI

J. Edgar Hoover had firmly repulsed any effort to involve the FBI in narcotics cases, but after his death there were pressures for the FBI to get involved. In 1977 the Attorney-General tried to guide the DEA towards more important cases by offering FBI involvement. The DEA suggested joint-task forces. A GAO study showed that DEA agents in some of the task forces worked to subvert them. The program ended in 1979.[xxxv] Two years later, in 1981, the FBI was asked to play a more important role in the War on Drugs, and once again there was an effort to establish cooperative ties.

The year after CENTAC was destroyed, the White House took action which indicated displeasure with the DEA. In 1983 the White House gave the FBI concurrent jurisdiction with DEA on drug cases, to enable greater emphasis on “criminal enterprises involved in drug trafficking.” The DEA was told to report through the FBI director to the Attorney General.[xxxvi] The “demotion” of the agency was resisted, and in practice, the DEA Administrator continued to report directly to the Attorney General. One measure that shows just how far removed from political realities the DEA high command had become is shown in the interchange in a Congressional hearing about the wisdom of Reagan’s appointing a “Drug Czar.” Director Mullen responded

There is a real divergence of opinion with regard to a drug czar, with many members of this body feeling that they should have a drug czar. I always thought I was one, as Administrator of DEA....[xxxvii]

The DEA responded to the “concurrent jurisdiction” policy by establishing Organized Crime -Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), ranking them third in its priority list. These Task Forces brought together investigators and prosecutors from numerous federal agencies. Expansion was rapid: from 12 cooperative ventures in 1981 to 751 in 1984. While it may look as though the DEA had resigned itself to focusing on kingpin cases with the FBI, a GAO probe in 1990 found the two agencies were “semi-autonomous in their attitudes and behavior,” with only about 6% of DEA cases and 16% of FBI’s cases being investigated jointly.[xxxviii]

Security Within DEA

A factor that makes the organizational model appear to be of critical importance in explaining DEA actions is the attitude of the agency towards its own security. A GAO investigation in 1992 showed great laxity , both within national headquarters and in two large field divisions. The problems found:

· Individuals without proper clearances worked unescorted in sensitive areas with free access to classified information.

· Unattended computers were left signed on.

· Computer-generated materials and documents of a sensitive nature were left unattended and unsecured.

· Electronic card-keyed doors to areas with classified information were turned off during working hours, and doors left open; “lost” keys were still in use, and card-keys had been issued to groups of persons including non-DEA personnel. No check was made of card-key access logs.

· Workstations were connected with non-encrypted lines, which permitted unauthorized persons to access classified data stored in another’s workstation without being detected.

· Personnel processed classified data in unshielded work areas on an Office Automation system which had not been approved for processing classified data (and did not have TEMPEST-protection), and, in violation of federal guidelines, utilized fixed-disk storage devices, raising the risks of retrieval by unauthorized persons.[xxxix]

A follow-up study revealed the DEA had taken no corrective measures.[xl] Since traffickers might well be expected to penetrate DEA headquarters, such inattention raised serious questions. Not only was security lacking in headquarters, but communications within and between offices and agents was compromised. Drug traffickers were captured with lists of the frequencies used by the DEA and other agencies involved in narcotic cases.[xli] No political bargaining model would account for the inattention to security that is revealed in the GAO study. One is reminded of the situation in the late 1960’s in New York, when informants were killed and cases compromised; the problem was easy access to the files with informants’ names.

Loss of Turf

1984 was the year when the DEA learned that its share of the drug enforcement budget had dropped from 69% in 1977 to 47% in 1982. Customs, which had been allowed to develop a narcotic interdiction program, and Coast Guard expenditures exceeded that of DEA. Mullen was surprised, but thought the cost of aircraft and ships would explain the data.[xlii] Later, with greater military involvement in the Caribbean, the DEA share would drop further.

Why Didn’t the DEA Guard Its Turf More Diligently?

By 1980, a case could be made that DEA wanted to “share the blame” of drug abuse with other agencies. Heroin use had ceased to be a major problem. Use was stable, and the end of the methadone program did not bring a resurgence of addiction. Use of LSD and other psychedelic drugs was down; cocaine was used primarily by the upper classes and was not considered a bad problem. The Reagan Administration was free to address parental concerns about use of marijuana by young teems. Marijuana became the chief enemy. That focus would change dramatically when crack hit the streets. Coming from Latin America, and unable to halt entry, perhaps the DEA wanted to show that other agencies, from the Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Customs could not stop it either.

Logical as that might seem, we gain additional insights from testimony in the 1973 Hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 2, which set up the DEA. Some police chiefs and other state and local officials criticized the idea of a central drug agency. They pointed to the problem of an organization which has a single goal and purpose, who could not put the problem in any kind of larger frame of reference. Would the agency be committed to maintaining a “drug-abuse industrial complex”? The example of the ATF was cited: it was created when there was a problem, but now it had a large staff and very little to do. Ending an agency is difficulty, and the ATF was so focused that its personnel could not be easily slid into drug enforcement, or other areas where attention was needed. Might not this be an eventual problem with a DEA?

Are not these concerns reflected in DEA policies we have reviewed?. The agency has a narrow focus. It does not include sections for treatment of drug abuse, medical use of drugs (even though it advises the Attorney General on what classification drugs ought to be placed in), research on uses or alternative programs of control, treatment, education, prevention, etc. It is strictly an enforcement agency, and sharply limited in alternatives. It is not likely that any organization will admit it is not and can not be terribly effective and that therefore, it should be downsized or obliterated. Preservation is the first commandment of any organization.

DEA personnel are neither stupid nor ignorant. Surely they have analyzed the data and put it in perspective. They know. Baum’s study is one of the few which attempts to put the drug abuse numbers in context, and this he does in every chapter. Cloyd wrote years ago and drug policy and information control. DEA manipulate the figures to preserve and enhance their domain, and while that might lead them to be cynical, it also shapes their role. To have 335,000 Americans taking cocaine daily may be a shocking figure, but that, after all, is .14 of 1% of the population. As Baum points out, when the first drug war was begun under Nixon, more people died from choking on food than from all licit and illicit drugs combined.[xliii]

Furthermore, DEA officials can hardly ignore the role of narcotics in foreign policy. Many studies have been made showing the historic relationships in the US.[xliv] McCoy, Scott, Marshal, Campbell, Leary, are a few of the better known studies about the use of narcotics in more recent foreign policy endeavors.[xlv] As DEA agent Levine pointed out so graphically, the drug war “was sacrificed regularly in favor not only of the war against communism but of a multitude of other interests.” [xlvi]

In domestic as well as foreign politics, those in DEA are bound to be aware that the “drug war button” will be flicked on and off depending on a host of considerations. The agency needs to assure itself of stable funding, and of its indispensability. They have chosen strategies which will be sufficiently visible to elected representatives and the law enforcement community to ensure continuation of public and political support. This is an agency following policies that will enable the agency and its employees to “live the good life forever.” It has become a “low bliss” agency.

Thus we see standard operating procedures which give autonomy to regional units. We see “satisficing” almost continuously in policy, and “next step” choices from a standard repertoire. “Planning ahead” is not valued as much as, in their own words, spontaneity in starting investigations; short-term feedback works out better than long complex and intricate policies that take years to work through. The “Cowboy” is the preferred image, and low level shoot-outs (whether eradicating ditchweed, engaging in buy-busts or sell-busts) are fine. The DEA delights in directing the monies from asset forfeiture back to cooperating state and local law enforcement agencies, and seeing that federal prosecutors are overloaded with cases from those agencies. Their actions either benefit these agencies, direct attention from the societal results, or divert attention from themselves.

The organizational culture that developed from 1969 to 1976 is critical for understanding the standard operating procedures and the reaction to political initiatives. This paper has tried to show the internal factors which led to the change, and to document the continuance of that culture. Despite the efforts of successive Administrator’s, by the 1990’s the DEA was still ODALE-ized.