Conundrum:
Illicit Narcotics and Theoretical Approaches
in International Politics
Prepared for the
International Studies Association, Feb. 16-20, 1999, Washington, D. C.
by
Angela S. Burger, Prof.,
Political Science
University of Wisconsin
Colleges: Marathon, in Wausau
aburger@uwc.edu
Abstract:
Current theoretical approaches distort as much as they reveal about the role of illicit
narcotics in international politics.
Political state-centric models view narcotics enterprises as the
anti-state, and justify repression. The
perspective of International Regimes or organization is that of
prohibition. However, non-political
models (economic, developmental, eco-political, Weberian) and analysis in the
field reveals positive aspects of illicit narcotics. The disjunction of theory limits our ability to offer effective
policy advice on a potent force in the world.
This paper explores components of a better political
paradigm including the acknowledgement of non-bureaucratic, non-governmental
participants as legitimate actors; reconfiguring cost-benefit due to the
"intermestic" nature of actors, and emphasis on long-term
security. This approach may help us
understand not only narcotic networks, but also epistemic communities,
environmentalists, ethnic
groups, and their respective interests.
Illicit narcotics offer a hard case
for theory and modeling in the sub-fields of international relations. Illicit narcotics are part of the globalization process, which, as Cerny
points out so cogently, reverberate to challenge the capacity of the state.[1] The irony is that many of the anti-narcotic
policies and practices of states strengthen globalization. The erosion from without and from within
present dilemmas for those studying states, especially in an arena where norms
are contested. The purpose of this
paper is to briefly analyze some of the problems that arise in applying models
from different sub-fields on the narcotics issue, particularly in terms of
their prescription for state policy,
and to draw on existing literature to suggest directions for fruitful
movement.
Realism
and Security Studies
Realism and Structural Realism,
while challenged, have been the
dominant paradigm in international politics and in the sub-field of security
studies since World War II.[2] All recognize the state as the fundamental unit, specify the condition of
anarchy and the principle of self-help.
The prima facie case for
applying these approaches to illicit narcotics lies in the perceived threat to
the state from the industry.
The
concept of “national security” narrowed then widened as the century
progressed; in the 1950’s it had a
hard-nosed focus on strategic military defense of the state’s territory. As the Cold War declined, the concept broadened
to include economic factors (energy, scientific technology, trade, foreign
investment), environmental factors (pollution, ozone, global warming),
socio-political factors (migration, population, welfare).[3] Threats from illicit narcotics could be part
of the broader definition, depending on definition..
When
President Ronald Reagan formally made illicit narcotics a part of the US
national security agenda in 1986, key factors included economic losses, and
social conflict (crime, disorder), as well as preferences of core political
supporters.[4] The porosity of borders presented an
additional dilemma. Other western
states faced different factors, including terrorist activities financed by
narcotics profits. Even states with few
problems had to increase attention to illicit narcotics if only to respond to
US foreign policy initiatives.[5]
In
the Third World, the concept of national security embraced threats to state
borders (secessionist efforts of the
Shan in Myanmar, Sikhs and Kashmiris in India,[6]),
to domestic ruling elites (Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia,[7]), as well as internal political rebellion
(Shining Path in Peru, tribes in Afghanistan against Soviet puppet-government).[8]
National
security paradigms were not always appropriate in prescribing policy options to
deal with illicit drugs. That the
models equated the state with the
government, and sometimes with elites running the government, meant that the
narcotics sector was an “anti-state” to
be crushed. The logical response to
illicit narcotics was to privilege
enforcement organizations, to
give them increased powers over civilians, and to adopt stricter laws as well as heavier penalties. These choices tended to denigrate treatment
or harm reduction policies, or concerns of the
health and medical communities.
Choosing
a realist and security orientation meant ignoring the forces generating the
ubiquitous struggle between
consolidation and fragmentation within states as well as the world system. Ethnicity as a unit of identity, leads to fragmentation, just as economic interdependence leads to
greater consolidation.[9] Socially constructed, ethnic ties (i.e.,
nationalism) can intensify in an effort
to preserve, mobilize and advance the group. Preservationist efforts can become secessionist, if not
accommodated. Faced with what appear to
be policies of extinction, group members can migrate, rebel, or, of course assimilate.
Rebellion or secession is likely to intensify if the security forces
involved are members of the dominant ethnic group. Likewise, the effort of other groups, whether class-based or
religious, to gain entry and upward mobility in a political system, can turn to
rebellion unless accommodated. [10]
The
dominant culture-identity in a state can choose various strategies towards
minority groups: elimination,
separation, assimilation (ethnocide) or accommodation. The logic of the realist and security models
was to advise governments to avoid accommodation of those involved with narcotic production or traffic, and prevent their upward mobility.
The
nexus between global and substate
forces thereby comes into being. From
a minority perspective, access to illicit narcotic profits and what these
profits can purchase, can prevent elimination or assimilation, and can compel the governing elites to negotiate. To bargain the structure and process of decisional power within
the state does not weaken the state; in
the long run a negotiated settlement might lead to greater stability and
cohesion. If access to narcotic profits enables less
privileged sectors of society to better
their economic position relative to other groups in the state, and increase
their bargaining power with the
dominant group, the result might be a more inclusive state, with greater
stability. Realism and national
security models do not recognize this logic.[11] Two cases:
1.
The
case of the Shan in Myanmar
demonstrates the conflict between consolidation of a state which would be
dominated by group (Burmans) and an
ethnic minority. The Shan’s rebellion was self-funding because of illicit
heroin profits, and thus almost impossible to put down.[12] Eventually the Burman elite recognized the
futility of trying to dominate or eliminate the Shan, and gave up the effort to
eliminate the heroin industry. From
State Department reports it seems that
the quietly negotiated settlement called for heroin profits to be
utilized to buttress the state and its economy. [13]
2.
In
Pakistan, the growth of illicit opium and heroin in the NorthWest Frontier
Province and Baluchistan, which appeared initially to pit minorities against
the “colonizing Punjabis,” soon involved multiple ethnic groups (including the
Punjabis) either in transport, manufacture, sale or export.[14] Minority ethnic groups were strengthened
vis a vis the Punjabis, and the interdependence might have positive long-term
consequences.
Another
major problem was the unwillingness of those using security models or realism
to take into account an economic dimension of narcotics. The self-help principle should have led
analysts to recognize that profits from illicit narcotics could relieve what
Payer called the “debt trap,” and
assist state autonomy from global economic pressures.[15] At one and the same time, illicit narcotics
can promote autonomy of some states
while promoting global trade and financial interdependence.
Further,
illicit drug profits can be considered a new form of economic assistance from
the First to the Third World. The
transfer of wealth is neither controlled by the First World in terms of its
use, nor has to be paid back with interest.
If a state is to protect its economic and political security, which is essential to the actions of states
in realist theory, then an effort to harness an illicit narcotic industry seems
to be a rational choice. Examples:
1.
In
Colombia, the Medellin and Cali cartels offered four times to pay off the
entire national debt of Colombia. The
two cartels built more public housing
than the government, built schools and clinics, repaired sewers, provided rural
electrification, introduced better breeding stock in the cattle industry. At the same time, each provided protection from guerilla forces in
parts of the countryside.[16] The perceived threat to ruling elites,
however, received dominant attention in
Colombia and around the world.
2.
When the Mexican government in the 1980’s,
bedeviled with recession and severe debt repayment problems yet trying to
maintain its integrity vis a vis the US,[17]
chose to make a deal with illicit producers, manufacturers, and traffickers of
marijuana, cocaine, crack, and heroin, that choice would be logical under the
realist rubric. That it was chosen
should not have been a surprise.
Most
political leaders and foreign policy analysts in the First and Third Worlds,
despite utilizing a national security or realist framework, viewed the
narcotics industry in this light. It is
hard to explain the lapse without referring to global norms.
Neo-Liberalism
or Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
An
anomaly which appears frequently in studies of illicit narcotics cannot be
accommodated within realism, but finds explanation within neo-liberalism. Even the governments most emphatically
opposed to narcotics use and trafficking, and seemingly harmed by the severity
of the problem, sometimes have seemed to lose interest in, or ignore the illicit traffic. Rhetoric may have continued but actions
changed.
Nye
and Keohane's concepts of complex
interdependence and mutable priorities permit
us to understand actions of multiple states in critical periods.[18] For example, both the US and France are known for a strong stance in
international and national circles for control and regulation of narcotics. However, more important priorities at given
points in time can explain the actions of both, in Europe and Southeast Asia
between the 1940's and mid 1970's, in Pakistan-Afghanistan and Central America in the 1980’s.[19] Many scholars and journalists documented the
priority given by US officials to “winning” battles in the Cold War, even if
that meant acquiescing in the production or trafficking in illicit drugs.[20] Both the US and France operated under
realism, counterbalancing threat, pursuing amoral, prudent, rational national
interests.
Neoliberalism
makes the choices of Mexican, Pakistani, and Myanmar officials in the 1980’s, and Colombian leaders in the
1990's understandable. Priorities
change.
A
key thrust of neo-liberal institutionalism is the attention directed towards
cooperation, multilateralism, and the building of International Regimes. Robust models have been developed by
imbricating norms and values with organizations.[21]
An International Regime in narcotics developed
through this century, in large measure due to US policy entrepreneurs and dedication.[22] Models of regime formation, maintenance,
and transformation, can and have been applied.[23] On the one hand, conferences have been held,
multiple conventions negotiated, and institutions established to monitor,
control and limit narcotic use and psychotropic substances.[24] The issue area appears dense, with linkages
to agencies in crime, law, banking, civil aviation, postal, agricultural
development, health, and labor, etc. The effect of sequential expansion of
members, however, has not led to the deeper cooperation as postulated by Downs,
Rocke and Barsoon.[25] Historical research on the process of
regime formation raises questions on
interpretation.
The
history of the Regime is one in which US efforts to restrict narcotic use and
permit intrusive regulatory measures were repeatedly rejected, first by
European powers and, upon expansion after World War II, by European and Third
World states.[26] Other states regularly counter-balanced the
US, thus demonstrating the realist paradigm.
The Hegemonic Stability Theory does not have support. The high point of US influence was 1953, and
was followed by increasing resistance.
That is a short hegemony.
International cooperation is not possible unless policy preferences of
member states converge, and the members are willing to commit to
restraints.
It
is very curious, given the record, to see the powerful role of moral authority
exercised by the US,[27]
to such an extent that the better interpretation of the Regime might be sociological institutionalism. According to Finnemore’s summation, states
adopt certain behaviors which embody values central to a larger world culture,
and are needed for legitimation of a state as "modern." States join the requisite international
organizations and rhetorically ascribe to the values, even when its rules run
counter to their expressed national interests.
However, in action, isomorphisms are limited because of contrary
elements in world culture.[28] And, we might add, by domestic pressures.[29]
More
detailed analysis of the narcotics control Regime raises the question of how we assess Regime
effectiveness? Young reminds us that
deviant behavior should not be treated as evidence of breakdown.[30] Stein points out that the Regime may have
been created to help avoid a common
aversion, and in such a case the
absence of success does not mean failure.[31]
So the growth of a huge illicit narcotics industry should not be interpreted as
a sign of failure. That the illicit
industry is often not under state control is an important mitigating
factor.
Bernauer’s
analysis of various efforts to assess
effectiveness of international organizations in the environmental area shows
the difficulty of the task. My own
efforts are along the same lines as Bernauer's
whose proposal focuses on outcomes (goal attainment), effect of the
operations of the institution on its goals, and variations in institutional
design.[32] Our differences arise because he is dealing with a data-rich Regime, while
that of narcotics is data-poor. Here
are a few features of the data problem, resting on the operations of the key
institutions in the narcotics regime:
the Commission of Narcotic Drugs
and International Narcotics Control Board:
¨
Secrecy: the INCB considers its agenda, minutes,
correspondence and interaction with member states, as well as data provided by member states to be
confidential. They do not permit access
to the files for research, nor do they share information with other UN
agencies. The CND has a similar concern with confidentiality.[33] Neither organization has a sunset provision
on confidentiality.
¨
Non-
comparable and unreliable data: Both
the INCB and CND collect and publish
data. The variation between the INCB’s
(initial estimates) and CND’s (final figures)
is quite large. Within the CND,
figures on exports and imports differ markedly.[34] States submit data based on their own
interpretation of what is being asked, so the data is not comparable. There is no congruence in data between
states, or within states over time.[35]
¨
Lapses
in monitoring and control measures. One
of the highlights of licit narcotic control is provision of a lengthy paper
trail authorizing the import of narcotics, and the export, with multiple copies
to and from governments, firms, customs, and the UN. The INCB noted falsified
import certificates, mislabeling of drugs, and failure of the UN and member
states to receive the multiple documents that round out transactions. Some states could not find records of
authorizations over several years.[36] Western states refused to extend the control
system to psychotropic drugs.
Haas asked, “Do regimes matter?”[37] A central question is whether Regimes
constrain actors. One measure of
assessing effectiveness is to examine
instances which illustrate
constraint. We fine few instances of compliance when counter to
state interests. [38]
One notable and surprising feature of the
International Regime has been the veritable chasm between it and the World
Health Organization. The WHO does not control the medical and
scientific classification of narcotic and psychotropic drugs. The health regime has expressed formal
concern about inadequate pain relief in most states. The narcotics Regime prides itself on limiting such drugs, which
could, after all, be misused. In spite
of the growth in world population, usage of narcotic drugs in absolute
quantities is about a third of what it
was in the 1920’s.
The same pattern is seen in the US: the DEA controls classification of
narcotics, and does so without seeking advice from the medical community.[39] The Congress discovered in 1986 that the
estimates of US medical and scientific needs for narcotics had been drawn up by
narcotic agencies since the 1930's without any input from the medical or
scientific communities at all. The AMA and organizations such as Cancer Pain
Institute have expressed the need for
greater attention to relieving pain.
However, the agency which
investigates doctors' drug prescriptions is the DEA. It is ironic that drug use has been limited medically, and few scientific studies made, while drugs are widely available for
recreational use.
Study of international organizations invites
re-examination of institutions, and the agent-structure problems, compliance,
et al., of public administration, and relating these to domestic politics and
foreign policies. Such studies are
particularly important for bureaucracies which function both domestically, in
foreign policy, and within international organizations.[40]
For example,
drawing on Gourevitch, a case could be made that US domestic policies
are both preference-driven and institutional-driven. In the 1980’s the aggressive institutional (DEA and Drug Czar’s
office) “swallowed” the political
preferences. [41] To propose
reform is high risk for elected or
appointed officials. The US as prime
mover in the narcotic regime, promotes
policies adopted in the domestic arena.
In the narcotics Regime, an appropriate metaphor for the US might
be the Energizer Bunny, powered by drug
agency batteries, "just going and going and going." Other countries cooperate to set up
roadblocks and concrete lane barriers
to force a turn. In silent agreement,
they’ll let him keep banging the drum (i.e., dominating discussion in the
Regime).
At the theoretical level, the problem here is the
gulf between comparative and international, on the one hand, and public
administration and political bureaucratic models on the other. Graham Allison’s organizational model was
engulfed by the political bargaining model.
Decision-making studies in foreign policy owe more to political
bargaining than to public administration.
The institutionalists need the latter.
Years ago Prof. Harry Scoble spoke scathingly of the “incestuous
insemination of otherwise barren sister disciplines.” Incest is no longer an issue: our subfields are more like second cousins
twice removed.
Economic Liberalism
Why should political models of realism,
neo-liberalism, or hegemonic stability theory be applied to study illicit
narcotics, when those paradigms are not
utilized to analyze the multinational corporations, the World Bank, the IMF, or
other transnational organizations?[42] These are economic structures and processes
which should and usually are examined using liberalism, mercantilism, or world
structure paradigms.
Most studies
of MNCs, IMF, World Bank, NGO's deal
with markets, interactive processes, and
bureaucratic “white” organizations. Illicit narcotics are but one part
of the underground gray or black economy.
Is it large enough to bother with?
Efforts to "size" the industry is plagued by the problem of
mythical numbers, but in recent years the estimates suggest a value in the same
range as petroleum and arms sales in international politics. That is a significant size.
If domestic political pressures do play a
significant role in strengthening or weakening international regimes, then we
need to focus on the importance of the illicit industry on individual
states. Guestimates also determine that
importance:
·
In
Pakistan in the 1980's, the earnings of the illicit narcotic sector were
estimated to be larger than the government's budget, and fully 25% of the GDP.[43]
·
In
Afghanistan, narcotics are likely to provide a large portion of total
income; the Taliban is said to control
and tax about 96% of the poppy cultivation (which almost doubled between 1992
and 1997); they also tax the refiners.[44]
·
In
1990, Andreas suggested that the Peruvian economy was addicted to
coca dollars, an interesting play on words.[45]
A
problem that arises in studying the black economy is the limited value of
existing studies of "white"
bureaucratic institutions. It may be
tempting to view the illicit narcotics industry as bureaucratized, but at the risk of serious error.
Reuter’s Disorganized Crime
(1983) offers a critical insight.
What
common structures can be teased out of
varied studies made about illicit narcotics? First, structures have a strong ethnic base. Clan, tribe, familial ties appear to be of primary
importance. However, drugs pass through
different stages--from field production to transport to manufacturing to
transport to lengthy lines of distribution--and at each nodal point there often
seems to be a transfer from one ethnic/clan/familial unit to another. This is a
complex personalized, not a bureaucratic structure. It is rational from the
standpoint of security of an underground organization.[46]
Second,
different types of traffickers exist.
Some can be classified as
“private and economic (greedy),” in the sense that they are
participating in the enterprise for personal gain. These appear to be organized in chains of patron-client networks. Private greedy traffickers pay bribes, and corrupt government
officials, but they need the stability of government in order to operate
smoothly; they can be expected to support the state.
Traffickers
who operate to support the political ambitions of an ethnic, nationality,
religious, ideological cause are “public and political." The profits are channeled to the cause rather
than to conspicuous consumption. This
type is more likely to challenge the state.
However if the goal is legitimacy and participation in decisional
circles, public and political traffickers
will initially support the
state.
Third,
the private and public types provide
economic benefits along the chain of operations. Both can undertake economic development activities with their
profits, but these will differ in form and purpose. The private greedy traffickers may be responsible for greater consumption
of those in the patron-client network.
The public political traffickers are more likely to divide the proceeds
into discrete areas: into arms and
training if their goal requires challenging the state, into economic development that will resonate
among possible followers, into education and cultural activities which proclaim
values and beliefs. Here you will find
examples of Cerny’s nodes of private and quasi-public economic power, of cases
where these become “more sovereign than the state.”[47]
Economic
benefits from illicit narcotics are usually denigrated, with a charge that
such monies “distort” the economy. This criticism needs to be tested.
Almost all development distorts
something, and most comparativists can
point to series of decisions by private firms, governments, and multinational
organizations that have had significant deleterious effects in one state after
another.
Fourth,
the effort to detect and destroy the transnational financial networks utilized
by traffickers to launder their ill-gotten gains is a logical tactic which is likely to have logical
consequences.[48] The financial checks which work fairly well in First World bureaucratized
societies may have limits in the Third
World. For example, the havela
or hundi system has worked quite well in Asia and the Middle
East for centuries. These are
personalized banking systems for transfers of funds within states and
internationally, which are said to be utterly reliable. The phone, fax, and e-mail operate more
swiftly than technologies of old, and are more difficult to disrupt.
We
can hypothesize that the greater the
attack on the use of the open, formal bureaucratized banking system, the more
likely traffickers are to turn to the havela/hundi
system. The effort designed to ensure that traffickers
"have no place to hide" their monies may result in greater security
for them. Havela banking can rely on close-knit ethnic, clan, religious
linkages. The ease of communication,
transportation, travel, etc., can enhance the development of gray or black
global financial linkages.
Huntington's clash of civilizations may not be the "west vs. the
rest," but bureaucratized versus personalized structures. The illicit traffic provides evidence of
plurilateral globalization, of a world system based on “functionally
differentiated spheres of economic activity” and “institutional structures
proliferating in an ad hoc fashion to fill the power void…” [49] Once again, state actions may force
globalization which reduces the effectiveness of the state internally.[50]
Luis
Escobar makes a case that illicit drug traffickers are one of the most
“modern” sectors of the population in
Weberian terms. That finding has
implications for development theorists.[51] Certainly traffickers ascribe heartily to the doctrines of free
trade and liberal economies, and drive
towards globalization of trade and
finance.
Couldn't
different and perhaps more effective policies be developed to control the
illicit narcotic industry if they were based on the known differences in goals,
ethnicity, and characteristics of structures?
Mercantilism
Instead
of "one size fits all" policies of prohibition or extermination,
couldn't more sophisticated targeting be accomplished, with efforts to draw
certain elements from the black into the gray or white? To turn the "modern" traffickers
into legitimate entrepreneurs, spurring development? Couldn’t this be accomplished through an alternative
medicalization policy?
Producer,
manufacturing, or trafficking states could
authorize or encourage indigenous pharmaceutical firms for "natural
narcotics." These are not logical
activities for Western pharmaceuticals, who can patent chemical innovations but
not natural products. However,
natural products are less expensive, which opens a window of opportunity
for entrepreneurs to produce and export a medically useful product.
The
organized crime literature shows that with the passage of generations, it is
customary for members to strive for legitimate status in society. Licit medical production offers an avenue, and one that would
likely lead to some efforts to restrain cultivation, in order to match
production and sales.
Would
peasants limit production? The cases of
India and Turkey show that licit poppy is far more profitable than other
products, and that peasants accept licensing and variation in acreage
allowed. Controlled production can
work. By contrast, crop substitution,
according to Brunn, in 1975, has never been successful; few studies exist to
challenge his assessment.[52]
These
proposals are clearly
mercantilist. They do suggest
that some states are likely to permit
the illicit industry, and try to draw
on their profits to bolster the state.
Balance of payment crises do promote the opening of financial markets,
but Haggard and Maxfield's orientation
does not lead them to consider
the option of opening the door to narco-monies.[53] Myanmar and Mexico are examples. It is a
mark of the importance of norms and values, which are strongly anti-narcotic,
that many states reject such a policy.
However, there is little evidence that either Myanmar or Mexico has adopted policies which would steer
traffickers into the licit economy.
Policy-makers might want to ponder alternatives: what would be worst--a narcostate with
significant alliances with the illicit or a
state that has adopted policies to entice the traffickers “to come in
from the cold”? Again, international
relations theories and comparativist approaches do not usually provide a
framework for analysis, much less
advice.
Dependencia
or Structural World System Theory
McNicoll
was one of the first to provide a North/South perspective on narcotics, whether
licit or illicit. McNicoll pointed out
that throughout, the stance of the North has been to place onerous controls on
the South (far more expensive controls, for example, on opiates than on
chemical formulations of western pharmaceutical firms). A favorite policy position of the North is
to say, in effect, “stop producing your natural products and buy our chemicals
from us.”[54]
The
McNicoll thesis would find support in the efforts of the US in particular, and
the International Regime in general, to halt production of opiates in the Third
World and transfer production to the First World. Pressure was applied to end poppy production in Iran, and then
Turkey, and India. Nothing was done to stop production in
Australia, Spain, and other European
states.
The
North has refused to adopt the same
stringent measures of control over the manufacture and trade in chemical and
psychotropic formulations of pharmaceutical firms in the North, that have been
regularly applied in the South.
McNicoll points to a bias in the way the system operates, to favor the
North at the expense of the South, in licit production. The illicit traffic may be a counter—it
benefits the South at the expense of the North.
Added
to that are policy prescriptions put forth by the US DEA, and by some
academics, which call for Third World states to adopt expensive control measures that would benefit the North. From a Third World perspective, the
proposals would be all-cost, no
benefit.[55]
A
core-periphery case, thus stated, sounds strong. By contrast, the illicit industry can be viewed as liberalism in
action, benefiting the periphery.
Programs of crop substitution, training, education, and enhancement of
capabilities to cope with the illicit illustrates cost to the North with
benefits to the South. Weak states,
threatened from within, might otherwise have difficulty coping with a
significant illicit sector.
Strengthening functional linkages, whether journalists, law enforcement
personnel, or narcotics agents, serves to buttress states. Those programs also enhance
globalization.
Conclusion
The
illicit narcotics industry poses multiple problems in societies and states, and
for theorizing in international relations.
A key problem is that we are dealing with illegitimate actors. They
are quintessentially Non-Governmental Organizations; their structures are
personalized with a strong ethno-religious tie, rather than bureaucratic. They are a powerful global economic force,
and can either support or threaten states and governments, just as the abuse of
their product can harm individuals, families, and communities.
The
state-centric orientations within our discipline lead us to ignore important facets of the illicit industry--the ethnic
or class dimension, the driving struggle for participation, the impetus towards globalization and
modernization. Our subdivisions and
existing focus limits our ability to develop a workable theory which would
promote understanding, and lead to policy options that might “work.” The nested game concept may be more
appropriate than Putnam's two-level game, in modeling the tensions and options
in the relationships.[56]
With
the end of the Cold War, International Politics, as a field of study, has been
moving towards a more sophisticated understanding of the world. Price and Tannenwald’s study of two other
prohibition regimes (chemical and nuclear warfare) illustrate the
operation of norms (but the
state-centric focus limits its applicability to narcotics).[57] The effort to link comparative and
international, by studying foreign
policies and international politics in terms of domestic factors rather than structural system factors, and to
see domestic impacts of the international on the domestic, is to be
lauded. Multilateralism, along with
Regimes and institutionalism offers a
convergence of different approaches, and the interest in moving forward
towards more rigorous analysis. Studies
of Non-Governmental Organizations have exploded. [58]
Theoretically, the effort of Moravcsik to develop liberalism which differs from
neoliberalism, is a fascinating development. No academic who surveys international
relations can help but be impressed by the
intellectual energy and vitality of the search to better understand the
world over time. It is frustrating,
however, to find no approach, no model
which allows us to come to grips with
the problem of illicit narcotic traffic.
This
paper does not call for legalization of drugs. It does suggest that
International Relations scholars could offer better theory and analysis, which
would enable us to propose policy
alternatives which may be
The
direction suggested lies in acknowledging the wisdom of treating the
"illegitimate" as actors in intellectual models, to extending studies
of NGO's and MNCs to the current underground--to non-bureaucratized structures
and agents. It lies in focusing on
long-term security, which means considering ethnic and class questions in
relationship to national security and narcotics. It lies in further studies of
International Regimes, to inquire why other Regimes are more effective
than that in narcotics. Most of all,
we need to continue the process of subfield insemination, in the expectation
that the result will be more propitious than the dalliance of a one-night
stand.
[1] Cerny, 1995, pp. 596-597.
[2] Baldwin, ed. 1993. Powell 1994. Brooks, 1997. Kapstein, 1995. Keohane, ed, 1986. Gilpin, 1981. See also Martha Finnemore 1996 (1). Kolodziej 1992. Marshall 1991 (1). Ullman, 1983. Walt 1991. Burger 1993. Weinbaum and Kumar, 1995. Lupsha 1989.
[3] Brown 1977, Eberstadt 1991. Fischer 1993. Kakonen 1994, Renner 1989, Weiner 1993. Ayoob 1991, Buzan, 1983. O’Neill and Vincent 1990, Job 1992, Moran, 1996. Weiss and Kessler, 1991.
[4] Turf-battles between competing illicit drug wholesalers and retailers featured drive-by shootings, while the dollar outflow was sufficiently high to affect the balance of payments. Increases in juvenile use of drugs, and commission of crimes while under the influence of drugs or to obtain drugs, exacerbated the problem. Social cohesion which had begun to crumble during the period of the Vietnam War (and to some extent on generational grounds), was further threatened by the interface of an expanding drug culture and the advent of AIDS. Political victories of Nixon, Reagan, and Bush represented a backlash against these changes, and lent impetus to the national security designation. Baum, 1996. Sharp, 1994. McAllister 1991. Tullis 1995. For a broader approach see Snyder, 1991.
[5] Griffeth, 1993-94.
[6] In 1984 Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, asked for aid in handling the illicit narcotic traffic. The Iran-Iraq war had closed off the land route for heroin from the Golden Crescent of Afghanistan/Pakistan to Europe; traffickers moved heroin through western India to the west. The Government of India was concerned that Sikhs in the Punjab and Muslims in Kashmir, both seeking separate states and both bordering on Pakistan might engage in narcotics trafficking to fund their respective causes. Likewise, suspicions existed that officials in Pakistan or the Pakistani Army might actively encourage the trafficking. Buddenberg 1995. Burger, 1994, 1995. By 1992 there was general agreement among India, American, British, Canadian and German narcotics officials in India that the dissident forces had not entered the trafficking business. What involvement did exist was by individuals, not rebel organizations.; Interviews, April, 1992 in India.
[7] In the class-based politics of Colombia, the lower-class Medellin and Cali factions utilized illicit cocaine profits to gain wealth, and then sought entry into elite circles of government and society. The Medellin cartel, when thwarted by the existing elites was most willing to use force to achieve its goal. The cartel assassinated numerous government officials, and introduced a reign of terror. Lee, 1989, 1991. MacDonald 1989. Colombia asked for assistance in combating the two cartels, but once the two were decimated, the government had little interest in destroying the illicit cocaine industries operated by the existing elites. The US then decertified Colombia on the grounds they were not fully cooperating with the US in the anti-narcotic campaign.
[8]MacDonald 1989, Andreas 1990, Andreas et al, 1991-92. McCoy 1991. Lifschultz 1988. Tullis 1995, Walker 1989.
[9] Stuart J. Kaufman, 1997.
[10] Enloe (1980-1,2), Ellinwood and Enloe 1981. Horowitz 1985. Mackey 1980. Stohl and Lopez, eds. 1984. Clutterbuck, 1980. Zakaria, 1992. Kapstein, 1995. Horowitz 1985. Brass 1991. Eckstein 1964. Snyder, 1991, is relevant here.
[11] Kapstein 1995. Katzenstein, 1996, Risse-Kappen, 1995. Zakaria 1992.
[12] Leites and Wolf, 1980, Lupsha 1989.
[13] See the US State Department, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters Report in 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, on this point.
[14] See Buddenberg, 1995 manuscript. Jones, 1992. Ayesha Jalal, 1990.
[15] Naylor, 1987. Andreas 1990.
[16] Lee III, 1988, 1991. See also MacDonald 1989, Andreas, 1990.
[17] Reuter and Ronfeldt, 1992. Toro, 1995.
[18] Nye and Keohane, 1977.
[19] For the US, the need to defeat the Axis powers more easily led to the willingness to cooperate with “Lucky” Luciano and the Mafia in Italy and Sicily; Luciano was quoted as having told his colleagues in crime in the Mediterranean to provide help to intelligence agencies, who would then “look the other way” at drug smuggling as well as provide help to those arrested. Later the need to combat Communist control of the dock unions in Marseille led to US support of the Corsican drug-smuggling Mafia. Blumenthal, 1988. Campbell, 1977. McWilliams and Block, 1990. Pantaleone, 1966.
In Asia, McCoy, 1991 has documented the role of illicit narcotics traffic by the French military and intelligence service to finance the war in Indo-China, especially during those periods where the French government could not decide whether to fund or end that war. For corroboration see Jaubert, 1973. Kinder and Walker, 1986. Williams 1970.
Pakistan became a front-line state essential for supporting the Mujahaddin; the US provided armaments, etc., and the Pak army moved them to the Afghans. That the trucks came back loaded with heroin, with top Army officials and others close to President Zia participating in the trafficking, was the price to be paid to prevent Soviet domination of Afghanistan.. Buddenberg, 1995. See also Lifschultz, 1988 and McCoy 1991. Even as Golden Crescent heroin became dominant in seizures of the illicit in the US, officials of DEA and State, testifying before several Congressional committees, did not identify Afghanistan as a source of heroin until near the end of Soviet participation.
On Central America, see Scott and Marshall, 1991. Block, 1991. Levine, a DEA agent operating in Central and South America, offers a field-level perspective which supports Scott, Marshall, and Block
[20]. McCoy is one among many to show that the US looked the other way and sometimes took more positive actions (building landing strips, providing planes and pilots) that may have assisted the illicit traffic, in an effort to contain Communist forces . Bullington, 1990. Freemantle, 1986. Henman, Lewis, and Malyon, 1985. Johns, 1992. Kruger, 1980, Marshall, 1991, Mill, 1986. Kwitny, 1987. Corson 1972. Fitzgerald, 1972.
Anslinger, who headed the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and delighted in being a Cold Warrior, regularly testified in the 1950’s to Congressional committees and international control bodies that the prime source of illicit narcotics was Communist China. His successors abruptly reversed the charges in the 1960’s, much to the confusion of Congressmen. Kinder 1981. McWilliams, 1990. Kinder and Walker, 1986. Burger 1997. For more recent interpretations of the drug traffic as Communist-instigated, see Ehrenfeld 1990, and Douglas, 1990.
[21] Nadelmann, 1998.
[22] Nadelmann, 1990. See also Nadelmann, 1993.
[23] Krasner, 1983. Ruggie 1992. Young 1989. Burger, 1995. Haggard and Simmons 1987.
[24] Lowes, 1966. Walker, 1991. Willoughby 1976, Brunn et all, 1975. Burger 1993.
[25] Downs, Rocke, Barsoon, 1998, p. 398.
[26] Burger, 1995. A summary account: The Hague Convention of 1912 was ratified
only after it was folded into the Versailles treaty; to ratify the latter ratified the former. The US was excluded from the 1925 Geneva
conference, and walked out of the 1928 conferences when its proposals were
rejected. Europeans adopted the US
model for controlling pharmaceutical manufacturing in 1931, but when they
refused to adopt US preferences in 1936, the US stalked out of the conference.
In 1953, the US achieved two key goals—an Opium Protocol limiting use of
narcotics to medical and scientific needs, and limiting exports of opiates to 7
states. Unfortunately, very few states
ratified it in the following decade.
The 1961 Single Convention contained many elements the US supported,
including the provision that the narcotic control bodies did not have to accept
the views of the medical community (World Health Organization) in classifying
drugs. However other provisions
included admission of new producers and exporters, and increased support for
treatment programs for drug abuse. In
the UN, the US cast the sole negative vote against bringing the Convention into
force in 1964, and did not ratify it until 1967.
The Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1972, gave a greater role to World Health Organization advice, omitted regulation on the salts (the usual items in trade), permitted states to reject controls with a letter of notification. The US refused to ratify it until 1980, some four years after it came into effect.
In the 1988 Convention, other states reinserted traditional use with the medical and scientific, placed demand-control policies far higher than supply, and added barriers to penetrative policies (preferred by the US). These were opposed by the US. However, two US proposals were accepted: money-laundering was established as an international criminal offense, and bank secrecy was explicitly removed as grounds for refusing assistance. The negative features caused the US and several European states to delay ratification.
The effort to establish an International Criminal Court to deal with narcotics cases has seen an expansion of the types of offenses, which is so broad that the US Senate may be reluctant to ratify.
[27] Hall, 1997. See Kissinger, 1994, especially the contrast of Wilson with T. Roosevelt.
[28] Finnemore 1996 (2). The decisions by a consortium of European cities to follow a different set of policy prescriptions, demonstrates conflict with existing rules. The staff report of the US Congress’ HR Foreign Affairs Committee in 1990 suggests serious disagreement. Policy changes projected by sub-units (provincial governments in Australia, states such as California and Arizona) have been proposed, debated, and/or partially enacted.
[29] Gourevitch, 1996, pp. 349-373.
[30] Oran Young, “Regime Dynamics” p. 95, in Krasner, 1983. International Regimes.
[31] Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration,” p. 125, in Krasner, 1983. International Regimes.
[32] Bernauer, 1995. Burger 1993. See also Underdal 1992, Rittberger and Mayer, 1993.
[33] Brunn et al, 1975, pp. 75-96. See strong statement of confidentiality in 1991 Yearbook of the United Nations, p. 741. See also Morrow, 1994.
[34] Brunn et al, 1975, pp. 95-96. .
[35] Brunn et al, 1975, pp. 85, 130.
[36] Yearbook of the UN 1983, 00. 972-3. Brunn et al. 1975, pp. 75-80.
[37] Haas, 1989.
[38] The effort to restrict cultivation of opiates to select states has been only partially successful, with one of the offenders being Australia. The Regime was unable to persuade Australia (Glaxo, Johnson & Johnson) or Spain to abide by provisions of the 1953 Protocol or the 1961 Single Convention. Apparently economic privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics meant the disappearance of any controls over growth of poppy. The conviction of Noriega raises questions about the Panamanian government. The Regime regulates governments, not individuals.
[39] Baum, 1996, pp. 212-213. See also Rock, ed., 1971; Musto, 1983.
[40] Burger, 1994, 1996, 1997. Cerny, 1995. Cook and Wood, 1989. Kinder, 1991. Levine 1990. Rock, 1971. Musto, 1983. Quirk 1989. Scholz, 1991. Young, 1979, 1989. Risse-Kappen, 1995.
[41] Gourevitch 1996, pp. 350-351 for the model.
[42] Haggard, 1990, 1996. Strange, 1988. Naylor 1987.
[43] McCoy 1991, pp. 448-460. Buddenberg 1995 confirms.
[44] Washington Post, Oct. 5, 1998, p. A15. See also Washington Times, Nov. 30, 1998, p. A13.
[45] Andreas, 1990, pp. 515ff.
[46] Recent reports suggest that Osama bin Laden may be endeavoring to set up a vertically integrated enterprise, buying opium from Afghan peasants, transporting and converting it to heroin, providing security in warehouses, and distributing the drugs through his own network. The report does not suggest a bureaucratic enterprise; his organization may rely more on religious ties, involving multiple clan/ethnic groups along the chain. Washington Post, Oct. 5, 1998, p. A15. See also Washington Times, Nov. 30, 1998, p. A13.
[47] Cerny, 1995, p. 618.