Goffman, Erving. Gender Advertisements.
Take it that the function of ceremony reaches in two directions, the affirmation of basic social arrangements and the presentation of ultimate doctrines about man and the world. Typically these celebrations are performed either by persons acting to one another or acting in concert before a congregation. So “social situations” are involved - defining these simply as physical arenas anywhere within which persons present are in perceptual range of one another, subject to mutual monitoring - the persons themselves being definable solely on this ground as a “gathering.” (1)
It
is in social situations, then, that materials for celebrative work must be
found, materials which can be shaped into a palpable representation of matters
not otherwise packaged for the eye and the ear and the moment. And found they are. The divisions and hierarchies of social structure
are depicted microecologically, that is, through the
use of small-scale spatial metaphors.
Mythic historic events are played through in a condensed and idealized
version. Apparent junctures or turning
points in life are solemnized, as in christenings, graduation exercises, marriage ceremonies, and funerals. Social relationships are addressed by
greetings and farewells. Seasonal cycles
are given dramatized boundaries.
Reunions are held. Annual
vacations and, on a lesser scale, outings on weekends and evenings are assayed,
bringing immersions in ideal settings.
Dinners and parties are given, becoming occasions for the expenditure of
resources at a rate that is above one’s mundane self. Moments of festivity are attached to the
acquisition of new possessions. (1)
In
all of these ways, a situated social fuss is made over what might ordinarily be
hidden in extended courses of activity and the unformulated experience of their
participants; in brief, the individual is given an opportunity to face directly
a representation, a somewhat iconic expression, a mock-up of what he is
supposed to hold dear, a presentation of the supposed ordering of his
existence. (1)
A
single, fixed element of a ceremony can be called a “ritual”; the interpersonal
kind can be defined as perfunctory, conventionalized acts through which one
individual portrays his regard for another to that
other. (1)
If
Durkheim leads us to consider one sense of the term ritualization, Darwin, in his Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals, leads us, coincidentally,
to consider quite another; exaggerated, and stereo-typed-and loosened from any
specific context of releasers, and all this so that, in effect, there will be
more efficient signaling, both inter- and intra-specifically. These behaviors are “displays,” a
species-utilitarian notion that is at the heart of the ethological conception
of communication. Instead of having to
play out an act, the animal, in effect, provides a readily readable expression of
his situation, specifically his intent, this taking the form of a “ritualization” of some portion of the act itself, and this
indication (whether promise or threat)
presumably allows for the negotiation of an efficient response from, and
to, witnesses of the display. (If
The
ethological concern, then, does not take us back from a ritual performance to
the social structure and ultimate beliefs in which the
performer and witness are embedded, but forward into the unfolding course of
socially situated events. Displays thus
provide evidence of the actor’s alignment
in a gathering, the position he seems prepared to take up in what is about to
happen in the social situation.
Alignments tentatively or indicatively establish the terms of the
contact, the mode or style or formula for the dealings that are to ensue among
the individuals in the situation. As
suggested, ethologists tend to use the term
communication here, but that might be loose talk. Displays don’t communicate in the narrow
sense of the term; they don’t enunciate something through a language of symbols
openly established and used solely for that purpose. They provide evidence of the actor’s
alignment in the situation. And displays
are important insofar as alignments are.
(1)
Finally,
our special concern: If gender be defined as the culturally established
correlates of sex (whether in consequence of biology or learning), then gender
display refers to conventionalized portrayals of these correlates. (1)
(1)
Displays very often have a dialogic character of a statement-reply kind, with
an expression on the part of one individual calling forth an expression on the
part of another, the latter expression being understood to be a response to the
first. (1)
These
statement-response pairs can be classified in an obvious way. There are symmetrical and asymmetrical pairs:
mutual first-naming is a symmetrical pair, first-name/ sir is an asymmetrical
one. Of asymmetrical pairs, some are dyadically reversible, some not: the greetings between
guest and host, asymmetrical in themselves, may be reversed between these two
persons on another occasion; first-name/ title, on the other hand, ordinarily
is not reversible. Of dyadically irreversible pairs of rituals, some pair parts
are exclusive, some not: the civilian title a male may extend a female is never
extended to him; on the other hand, the “Sir” a man receives from a subordinate
in exchange for first-name, he himself is likely to extend to his superordinate
in exchange for first-name, an illustration of the great chain of corporate
being. Observe that a symmetrical
display between two individuals can involve asymmetries according to which of
the two initially introduced the usage between them, and which of the two
begins his part of the mutual display first on any occasion of use. (2)
(2)
Given that individuals have work to do in social
situations, the question arises as to how ritual can accommodate to what is
thus otherwise occurring. Two basic
patterns seem to appear. First, display
seems to be concentrated at beginnings and endings of purposeful undertakings,
that is, at junctures, so that, in effect, the activity itself is not
interfered with. (Thus the small
courtesies sometimes performed in our society by men to women when the latter
must undergo what can be defined as a slight change in physical state, as in
getting up, sitting down, entering a room or leaving it, beginning to smoke or
ceasing to, moving indoors or outdoors, suffering increased temperature or
less, and so forth.) Here one might
speak of “bracket rituals.” Second, some
rituals seem designed to be continued as a single note across a strip of
otherwise intended activity without displacing the activity itself. (Thus the basic military
courtesy of standing at attention throughout the course of an encounter with a
superior - in contrast to the salute, this latter clearly a bracket ritual.) One can speak here of a “ritual transfix” or
“overlay.” Observe that by combining these
two locations - brackets and overlays - one has, for any strip of activity, a schedule of displays. Although these rituals will tend to be
perceived as coloring the whole of the scene, in fact, of course, they only
occur selectively in it. (2)
(3)
It is plain that if an individual is to give and receive what is considered his
ritual due in social situations, then he must - whether by intent or in effect
- style himself so that others present can immediately know the social (and
sometimes the personal) identity of who is to be dealt with; and in turn he
must be able to acquire this information about those he thus informs. Some displays seem to be specialized for this
identificatory, early-warning function: in the case
of gender, hair style, clothing, and tone of voice. (Handwriting similarly serves in the
situation-like contacts conducted through the mails; name also so serves, in
addition to serving in the management of persons who are present only in
reference.) It can be argued that
although ritualized behavior in social situations may markedly change over
time, especially in connection with politicization, identificatory
stylings will be least subject to change. (2)
(4)
There is no doubt that displays can be, and are likely to be, multivocal or polysemic, in the
sense that more than one piece of social information may be encoded in
them. (For example, our terms of address
typically record sex of recipient and also properties of the relationship
between speaker and spoken to. So, too, in occupational titles [“agentives”]. In the principal European languages,
typically a masculine form is the unmarked case; the feminine is managed with a
suffix which, in addition, often carries a connotation of incompetence,
facetiousness, and inexperience.) Along
with this complication goes another. Not
only does one find that recognition of different statuses can be encoded in the
same display, but also that a hierarchy of considerations may be found which
are addressed sequentially. For example,
when awards are given out, a male official may first give the medal, diploma,
prize, or whatever, and then shake the hand of the recipient, thus shifting
from that of an organization’s representative bestowing an official sign of
regard on a soldier, colleague, fellow citizen, etc., to a man showing regard
for another, the shift in action associated with a sharply altered facial
expression. (2)
(5)
Displays vary quite considerably in the degree of their formalization. Some, like salutes, are specified as to form
and occasion of occurrence, and failure to so behave can lead to specific
sanctions; others are so much taken for granted that it awaits a student of
some kind to explicate what everyone knows (but not consciously), and failure
to perform leads to nothing more than diffuse unease and a search for speakable reasons to be ill-tempered with the
offender. (2-3)
(6)
The kind of displays I will be concerned with - gender displays - have a
related feature: many appear to be optional.
In the case, for example, of male courtesies, often a particular display
need not be initiated: if initiated, it need not be accepted, but can be
politely declined. Finally, when failure
to perform occurs, irony, nudging, and joking complaint, etc., can result -
sometimes more as an opportunity for a sally than as a
means of social control. (3)
(7)
Ordinarily displays do not in fact provide a representation in the round of a
specific social relationship but rather of broad groupings of them. For example, a social kiss may be employed by
kin-related persons or cross-sex friends, and the details of the behavior
itself may not inform as to which relationship is being celebrated. Similarly, precedence through a door is
available to mark organizational rank, but the same indulgence is accorded
guests of an establishment, the dependently young, the aged and infirm, indeed,
those of unquestionably strong social position and those (by inversion
courtesy) of unquestionably weak position.
A picture, then, of the relationship between any two persons can hardly
be obtained through an examination of the displays they extend each other on
any one type of occasion; one would have to assemble these niceties across all
the mutually identifying types of contacts that the pair has. (3)
(8)
People, unlike other animals, can be quite conscious of the displays they
employ and are able to perform many of them by design in contexts of their own
choosing. Thus instead of merely
“displacing” an act (in the sense described by ethologists),
the human actor may wait until he is out of the direct line of sight of a
putative recipient, and then engage in a portrayal of attitude to him that is
only then safe to perform, the performance done for the benefit of the
performer himself or third parties. In
turn, the recipient of such a display (or rather the target of it) may actively
collaborate, fostering the impression that the act has escaped him even though
it hasn’t - and sometimes evidently so. (3)
In
sum, how a relationship is portrayed through ritual can provide an imbalanced,
even distorted, view of the relationship itself. When this fact is seen in the light of
another, namely, that displays tend to be scheduled accommodatively
during an activity so as not to interfere with its execution, it becomes even more
clear that the version of ritual gives us of social reality is only that - not
a picture of the way things are but a passing exhortative guide to
perception. (3)
Displays are part of what we think of as “expressive behavior,” and as such tend to be conveyed and received as if they were somehow natural, deriving, like temperature and pulse, from the way people are and needful, therefore, of no social or historical analysis. But, of course, ritualized expressions are as needful of historical understanding as is the Ford car. Given the expressive practices we employ, one may ask: Where do these displays come from?
If,
in particular, there are behavioral styles - codings
- that distinguish the way men and women participate in social situations, then
the question should be put concerning the origins and sources of these
styles. The materials and ingredients
can come directly from the resources available in particular social settings,
but that still leaves open the question of where the formulating of these
ingredients, their styling, comes
from. (3)
For
our purposes, there is a source of display much more relevant than animal lore
or military tradition, a source closer to home, a
source, indeed, right in the home: the parent-child relationship. (4)
It
turns out, then, that in our society whenever a male has dealings with a female
or a subordinate male (especially a younger one), some
mitigation of potential distance, coercion, and hostility is quite likely to be
induced by application of the parent-child complex. Which implies that,
ritually speaking, females are equivalent to subordinate males and both are
equivalent to children. Observe
that however distasteful and humiliating lessers may
find these gentle prerogatives to be, they must give second thought to openly
expressing displeasure, for whosoever extends benign concern is free to quickly
change his tack and show the other side of his power. (5)
Allow
here a brief review. Social situations
were defined as arenas of mutual monitoring.
It is possible for the student to take social situations very seriously
as one natural vantage point from which to view all of social life. After all, it is in social situations that
individuals can communicate in the fullest sense of the term, and it is only in
them that individuals can physically coerce one another, assault one another,
interact sexually, importune one another gesturally,
give physical comfort, and so forth.
Moreover, it is in social situations that most of the world’s work gets
done. Understandably, in all societies
modes of adaptation are found, including systems of normative constraint, for
managing risks and opportunities specific to social situations. (6)
Our
immediate interest in social situations was that it is mainly in such contexts
that individuals can use their faces and bodies, as well as small materials at
hand to engage in social portraiture. It
is here in these small, local places that they can arrange themselves microecologically to depict what is taken as their place in
the wider social frame, allowing them, in turn, to celebrate what has been
depicted. It is here, in social
situations, that the individual can signify what he takes to be his social
identity and here indicate his dealings and intent - all of which information
the others in the gathering will need in order to manage their own courses of
action - which knowledgeability he in turn must count
on in carrying out his own designs. (6)
I
conclude with a sermon.
There
is a wide agreement that fishes live in the sea because they cannot breathe on
land, and that we live on land because we cannot breathe in the sea. This proximate, everyday account can be
spelled out in ever increasing physiological detail, and exceptional cases and
circumstances uncovered, but the general answer will ordinarily suffice,
namely, an appeal to the nature of the beast, to the givens and conditions of
his existence, and a guileless use of the term “because.” Note, in this happy bit of folk wisdom - as
sound and scientific surely as it needs to be - the land and sea can be taken
as there prior to fishes and men, and not - contrary to genesis - put there so
that fishes and men, when they arrived, would find a suitable place awaiting
them. (6)
This
lesson about the men and the fishes contains, I think, the essence of our most
common and most basic way of thinking about ourselves:
an accounting of what occurs by an appeal to our “natures,” an appeal to the
very conditions of our being. Note, we can use this formula both for categories of persons and
for particular individuals. Just as we
account for the fact that a man walks upright by an appeal to his nature, so we
can account for why a particular amputee doesn’t by an appeal to his particular
conditions of being. (6)
The nature of indexical signs given off by objects we call animal (including, and principally, man) are often called “expressions,” but the sense of that term here implied, our imagery still allows that a material process is involved, not conventional symbolic communication. We tend to believe that these special objects not only give off natural signs, but do so more than do other objects. Indeed, the emotions, in association with various bodily organs through which emotions most markedly appear, are considered veritable engines of expression. As a corollary, we assume that among humans a very wide range of attributes are expressible: intent, feeling, relationship, information state, health, social class, etc. Lore and advice concerning these signs, including how to fake them and how to see behind fakeries, constitute a kind of folk science. All of these beliefs regarding man, taken together, can be referred to as the doctrine of natural expression. (6-7)
Here
let me restate the notion that one of the most deeply seated traits of man, it
is felt is gender; femininity and masculinity are in a sense the prototypes of
essential expression - something that can be conveyed fleetingly in any social
situation and yet something that strikes at the most basic characterization of
the individual. (7)
In
sum, gender, in close connection with age-grade, lays down more, perhaps, than
class and other social divisions an understanding of what our ultimate nature
ought to be and how and where this nature ought to be
exhibited. And we acquire a vast corpus
of accounts to be used as a source of good, self-sufficient reasons for many of
our acts (particularly as these determine the allocation of minor indulgences
and deprivations), just as others acquire a sovereign means of accounting for
our own behavior. Observe, there is nothing superficial about this accounting. Given our stereotypes of femininity, a
particular woman will find that the way has been cleared to fall back on the
situation of her entire sex to account to herself for why she should refrain
from vying with men in matters mechanical, financial, political, and so
forth. Just as a particular man will
find that his failure to exert priority over women in these matters reflects on
him personally, giving him warrant for insisting on success in these
connections. (Correspondingly, he can decline domestic tasks on the general
ground of his sex, while identifying any of his wife’s disinclination here as
an expression of her particular character.)
Because these stereotypes begin to be applied by and to the individual
from the earliest years, the accounting it affords is rather well
implanted. (8)