Galbraith, John Kenneth. How to Control the Military. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969.

The problem of the military power is not unique; it is merely a rather formidable example of the tendency of organization, in an age of organization, to develop a life and purpose and truth of its own. This tendency holds for all great bureaucracies, both public and private. And their action is not what serves a larger public interest, their belief does not reflect the reality of life. What is done and what is believed are, first and naturally, what serve the goals of the bureaucracy itself. Action in the organization interest, or in response to the bureaucratic truth, can thus be a formula for public disservice or even public disaster. (14)

If the origin of the actions on arms is unclear, the consequence is not. In the language of labor relations, it is a sweetheart deal between those who sell to the government and those who buy. Once competitive bidding created an adversary relationship between buyer and seller and with numerous sellers a special relationships with any one provoked cries of favoritism. But modern weapons are bought overwhelmingly by negotiation and in most cases from a single source of supply. Under these circumstances, the tendency to any adversary relationship between the Services and their suppliers disappears. Indeed, where there are only one or two sources of supply for a weapons system, the Services will be as much interested in sustaining these firms as the firms are in being sustained. (28-29)

Among those who spoke about the sources of ideas on weapons needs, no one was moved to suggest that public opinion played any role. (29)