Burke, Kenneth. The Philosophy of Literary Form.
The magical decree is implicit in all language; for the mere act of naming an object or situation decrees that it is to be singled out as such-and-such rather than as something other. Hence, I think that an attempt to eliminate magic, in this sense, would involve us in the elimination of a vocabulary itself as a way of sizing up reality. Rather, what we may need is correct magic, magic whose decrees about the naming of real situations is the closest possible approximation to the situation named (with greater accuracy of approximation being supplied by the “collective revelation” of testing and discussion). (p. 4)
The main ideal of criticism, as I conceive it, is to use all that is there to use. And merely because some ancient author left us scant biographical material, I do not see why we should confine our study of a modern author, who has left us rich biographical material, to the same coordinates as we should apply in studying the work of the ancient author. If there is any slogan that should reign among critical precepts, it is that “all circumstances alter occasions.” (p. 23)
The “symbolism” of a word consists in the fact that no one quite uses the word in its mere dictionary sense. And the overtones of a usage are revealed “by the company it keeps” in the utterances of a given speaker or writer. (p. 35)
What, in fact, is “rationality” but the desire for an accurate chart for naming what is going on? (pp. 113-114, footnote 38)
The ideal word is in itself an act, its value contained in its use at the moment of utterance. Its worth does not reside in its “usefulness” and promise (though that is certainly a part of it) but in its style as morals, as petition, in the quality of the petition, not in the success of the petition. For preparations, anything may server, everything does serve – but preparations must not usurp the guise of fulfillments. (p. 167)
Of all the inconsistencies in which the human mind is entangled, this confusion between “goodness” and “sacrifice” seems the most unavoidable. Even were we to grant with the utilitarians that our notions of the “good” arise purely and simply from out notions of the “useful” and the “usable,” the fact remains that the best argument in favor of a “good” is one’s willingness to sacrifice himself for it. (p. 253)
Thus, by the ethical contradiction, categories as logically distinct as service and disservice, advantage and disaster, become fundamentally intertwined. It is not mere “compensation” that brings religion and failure together. By the “logic of the emotions” the religious feeling may demand failure as its symbolic counterpart. (p. 253)
Art forms like “tragedy” or “comedy” or “satire” would be treated as equipments for living, that size up situations in various ways and in keeping with correspondingly various attitudes. The typical ingredients of such forms would be sought. Their relation to typical situations would be stressed. Their comparative values would be considered, with the intention of formulating a “strategy of strategies,” the “over-all” strategy obtained by inspection of the lot. (p. 304)
1. The basic concept for uniting economics and psychology (“Marx” and “Freud”) is that of the “symbols of authority.” (p. 305)
2. The two basic dichotomous attitudes toward reigning symbols of authority are those of acceptance and rejection (with intermediate gradations, such as are to be found when any flat logical distinction is translated into the field of psychology). (pp. 305-306)
3. The need of rejecting the reigning symbols of authority is synonymous with “alienation.” (p. 306)
4. The purely psychological concept for treating relations to symbols of authority, possession and dispossession, material and spiritual alienation, faith or loss of faith in the “reasonableness” of a given structure’s methods and purposes and values, is that of “identity.” (p. 305)
5. In this complex world, one is never a member of merely one “corporation.” The individual is composed of many “corporate identities.” Sometimes they are concentric, sometimes in conflict. (p. 307)
6. In highly transitional eras, requiring shifts in allegiance to the symbols of authority (the rejection of an authoritative structure still largely accepted, even by its victims, who are educated in the wrong meanings and values by the “priesthood” of pulpit, schools, press, radio and popular art) the problems of identity become crucial. (p. 307)
7. The processes of change of identity are most clearly revealed by analyzing formal works of art and applying the results of our analysis to the “informal art of living” in general. (p. 308)
Art works, owing their high degree of articulateness, are like “meter readings.” Here all the implicit social processes become explicit. By studying them, you will discern what forms “alienation” takes as a factor in human experience, and what forms likewise arise in the attempt to combat alienation (to “repossess” one’s world). (p. 308)
8. Identity itself is a “mystification.” Hence, resenting its many labyrinthine aspects, we tend to call even the study of it a “mystification.” (p. 308)
10. “Style” is an aspect of identification. (p. 309)
By planned incongruity I mean a rational prodding or coaching of language so as to see around the corner of everyday usage. (p. 400)